


GEOGRAPHY AND HUMANISM

John Pickles



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by

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Subscribers to the CATMOG series may find it odd to see this volume appearing alongside others that are statistically orientated. As editor, I envisaged, four years ago, a collection of volumes that addressed the theme of *Geography and Science*, a theme that seemed entirely appropriate in a series concerned with concepts as well as techniques. Although commitments were obtained for other volumes it now seems unlikely that further volumes will appear concerned with this theme. I am grateful to Professor Pickles for his cooperation and enthusiasm with this venture.

PREFACE

The ideas developed in this book owe much to colleagues with whom I have studied and from whom I have learned. The genesis of and philosophical underpinnings for the ideas developed here owe much to discussions with Roger Downs, Joseph Kocklemans, Peter Gould, Don Kunze and Noriyuki Sugiura. Tony Gatrell and Denis Cosgrove have offered perceptive and useful comments on the manuscript.

I am grateful to Denis Cosgrove for suggesting some adjustments in what follows in my use of the term 'man' for 'human', particularly after nearly two decades of literature demonstrating how our language is so heavily weighted with sexist, as well as racist and ethnocentric meaning. A similar comment was made about my very first conference presentation several years ago. Then as now I recognize the strength of the argument, and hope that we can come to improve both our language and our society within which language takes shape. However, at the present the alternatives available seem clumsy and inadequate. Then as now I resist dropping 'man', although by so resisting I do not intend to give offence to anyone. Perhaps because of the strong Germanic influence on my ideas, 'man' is simply the one'; that being which stands open towards its world. Man is the human, mankind, humankind; man is *Dasien*. It is, as the OED defines it, a human being (irrespective of sex or age). I think this is the meaning our language gives to the word, and it is solely how it is intended in what follows. A related issue, again brought to my attention by Denis Cosgrove, is the influence of feminist gender theory and practice on humanism, in particular 'the critique of structuralist modes of thought, the need for reflexivity and self-examination of values'. These are intriguing issues, and ones which raise new possibilities in my own mind, but are not ones pursued in what follows. The interested reader may wish to pursue these ideas. In geography they have been specifically and recently addressed in Schmelzkopf (1985).

Dr. Cosgrove has also suggested that I come clean and explain how humanism can transcend the crazy dualisms between subjective-objective, fact-opinion, science-art, which so bedevil and stifle much contemporary geographical discourse - a project towards which this work is clearly aimed. However, I remain sufficiently a Cartesian to recognize that small steps, one at a time, placed correctly, may get me to my goal more assuredly than big, yet uncertain leaps. I hope to 'come clean' in work in progress.

Readers may be surprised to find that phenomenology is given only brief mention in this book. There are three reasons: (i) I do not think that phenomenology is central to understanding the actual development of

geographic humanism, although it did serve as a rallying call for many humanists and a convenient label to use for many nonhumanists;
(ii) phenomenology is an immensely productive enterprise, but as so often with what is valuable it is also a very complex and difficult one;
(iii) I have recently dealt at length with phenomenology (and to a lesser extent hermeneutics) in *Phenomenology, science and geography: spatiality and the human sciences* (Pickles, 1985) to which the interested reader is referred.

I would like to thank Tony Gatrell for his careful and helpful shepherding of this project from beginning to end; Ohio University, whose civilized six week break over the Christmas vacation provided the opportunity to put aside everyday matters and devote myself fully to writing this book; and my family, especially Lynn and my parents, who have come to accept little at times, such as Christmas, when others receive so much.

A final speculation: The traditional dualisms which this book are about are undoubtedly under attack and are crumbling. If humanism in the modern context means anything it must mean:

- a. the humanizing of science, and specifically that means the reunification of reflection with empiricism. More radically it means that we must recognize that scientific inquiry is an inherently philosophical enterprise and has philosophical and social implications.
- b. The humanizing of society - an infinitely more difficult project in the modern age when the structures of society, including democracy itself, are under increasing attack from capital, corporate privilege, and state and parastatal power. Under these conditions critique and reflection have been severed from social discourse, neither is valued, and truth and freedom are early victims.

NOTE ON THE USE OF THE GLOSSARY

The philosophy and theory of a discipline are notoriously charged with language which we do not use in everyday discourse. In this book I have attempted to be as clear as possible, but have not avoided such language. Such language can be necessary, correct, and useful. I hope that its usage here is all of these. Where a term is not immediately clear from the context I have provided an extensive glossary at the back of the book. The beginning student should use this often. The experienced theorist may also find the glossary useful, as it will almost certainly provide a key to where particular disagreements between us may lie.

The task of humanism in our time cannot simply be to resurrect a compact and apodictic model of 'human nature' - divorced from empirical findings and concrete experience. The proliferation of information suggests a more modest aim: to explore and delineate patiently the elusive contours of man in the midst of cultural diversity.

(Schrag, 1980, p 57)

...to act as interpreters of our world; to bear witness to its variety and significance, its beauty and horrors... witness must be by *affirmation* and *protest*, interpreting the world to man, and man to himself. (Powell, 1980, p 333)

I INTRODUCTION

The explicit use of the term 'humanism' and 'humanistic' to denote a sub-field, an approach, or a research programme in geography arose primarily in the 1970s (Tuan, 1971, 1974, 1976a; Mercer and Powell, 1972; Buttimer, 1974, 1976; Harvey, 1974; Entrikin, 1976) although the terms had been used earlier (Gauld, 1941; Jackson, J.B., 1952; Anon, 1963; Bunge, 1963; Parsons, 1969). The reasons for its appearance as a research field are complex, and a complete intellectual history of the antecedents, the origins and development of humanism in geography is not possible in a monograph of this length. The range and diversity of ideas and literature from which early views of humanistic geography grew, the range and diversity of the views held by the humanists themselves, and the current engagement of humanist philosophies of meaning with other philosophies (notably structuralism, Marxism, and critical theory) precludes such a comprehensive treatment. One has only to scan the footnotes of Lowenthal's (1961) essay on epistemology, or Lowenthal and Prince's (1965) essay *English landscape tastes*, or to read Yi Fu Tuan's (1974b) *Topophilia* to recognize that even the earlier works in this tradition ranged far and wide in their literary coverage.

The recovery of these external influences will have to await careful textual exegesis of the seminal works in the development of humanistic perspectives in geography. In what follows I will not attempt to situate the claims for a geographical humanism within the varied and historically important humanisms. Such an attempt has been initiated by Relph (1981) and in a more restricted fashion by Ley and Samuels (1978), by Gregory (1978a) and most recently by Jackson and Smith (1984). Undoubtedly more work will soon appear in this vein (see, for example, Kunze, 1983b; Cosgrove, 1985). This then is a book about humanism in geography. It is not a book about humanism as such.

(i) Two themes in the development of humanism in geography

Ley and Samuels (1978, 8-9) identify two distinct themes in the origins of humanism in geography. First, the literature of environmental and place consciousness: J.K. Wright's essays on geographical lore, geographical knowledge, and geosophy; David Lowenthal's epistemological and landscape studies; the historical-cultural explorations of landscape imagery and meaning in the work of Carl Sauer, Andrew Clark, Donald Meinig, and Paul Wheatley; Yi Fu Tuan's examination of the biological, psychological, and cultural contexts of place attachments and environmental attitudes; and Clarence Glacken's monumental study of the history of western ideas about man's relationship with nature.

During the preceding decades, these and other geographers published important programmatic statements and exemplars of the sort of work they had in mind when dealing with human geography, and all attracted attention and students by their claims. Clarence Glacken's (1967) *Traces on the Rhodian shore*, was especially important in showing how this theme could be recovered from classical and historical texts, and how it could inform our present understanding, while Wright (1947), Lowenthal (1961), and Tuan (1974b), in particular, illustrated the importance of cross-cultural contexts for

interpreting man's world. These works were themselves presaged by vast social changes, notable among them the rise of the environmental or ecological movement, particularly through the voices of such critics as Iain Nairn and Lyn White, and by the very important *Landscape into art* by Kenneth Clark (1956). More narrowly focused were the still significant interpretations of cultural attitudes from literary texts in Marjorie Hope Nicholson's (1959) *Mountain gloom, mountain glory*, and Paul Shepard's (1967) *Man in the landscape*, among others.

The ongoing reticence shown by many geographers to accept spatial analysis as the new core of their discipline undoubtedly also played an important role in the willingness of many to at least pay lip service to the claims for a humanism. Furthermore, the convenient distinction between science and the humanities provided a means by which the increasingly urgent methodological debates about human science could be readily avoided or side-stepped (Ley and Samuels, 1978).

The second source from which humanism arises in geography is the group of scholars which was directly concerned with the methodological and epistemological implications of the spatial analytic approach. To find what Ley and Samuels (1978, p 9) describe as the core of modern humanism in geography it is necessary not only to address its precedents or origins but also its changing, adapting, and moving forms in the work of those who would pursue human geography and social science'. For Buttimer, Tuan, Relph, Harvey, Olsson, and Ley and Samuels, among others, 'a principal aim of modern humanism in geography is the reconciliation of social science and man, to accommodate understanding and wisdom, objectivity and subjectivity, and materialism and idealism' (Ley and Samuels, 1978, p 9).

The literature of both environmental and place consciousness and of geography as human science was influenced by several other factors that come together at this time. Besides the critique of spatialism, questions about the role of planning, and the recognition of the normative nature of theory, several broad changes in outlook occurred: the ecological movement; the growing opposition to the Vietnam war in the United States; the break-up of European colonial empires around the world; and the Civil Rights movement in America. All operated as a backcloth against which academic study was projected. After the second world war, mass consumerism, information technologies, corporatism, and the power of the state became more evident. By the early 1970s the threat to individual expression and the basic issues of humanity (values, morality and freedom) was widely recognized. With this growing recognition of the power of information the objectivity of the empirical sciences was questioned (Harvey, 1974; Buttimer, 1974).

As the sciences succeeded moreover in breaking down the compartments of specialized knowledge, as with Humpty Dumpty, not even all the methodological weapons at their command could put him back together again... Certain pieces of fractured man were necessarily and always left out of the puzzle. To put man back together again with all the pieces in place, including a heart and even a soul, with feelings as well as thoughts, and with some semblance of secular and perhaps transcendental meaning became, as it were, the centripetal goal of the twentieth-century humanist renaissance. (Ley and Samuels, 1978, 2-3).

Humanism in geography thus can be seen as a response to scientism in science and society generally, to the spatialism and formalism that dominated geography throughout the 1960s, and to the tendency for rationalism to legislate the norms and parameters of human behaviour in the interests of an efficient technological society. In geography these issues take shape most coherently in the developing radical and humanist traditions. In Relph (1976; 1981), for example, modern capitalist society and its tendency toward cultural convergence, is seen as producing landscapes without places, and artificial locations without meaning for those who must use them. The American 'strip', the expansion of uniform suburbs, and the ubiquitous shopping mall typify the placelessness of the modern American landscape, threatening individuality, local involvement, community spirit, and ultimately the health of society and the future of man.

Geography must be concerned with how man lives in places (Relph, 1976), the nature of values in structuring social worlds (Buttimer, 1972), the rich aesthetic and literary dimensions of meaning (Lowenthal and Prince, 1965; Tuan, 1978), and the historical nature of socio-cultural landscapes (Tuan, 1976a). If we can measure residential and shopping preferences we can also measure, and plan for, attitudes towards, and preferences for, townscapes (Goodey, 1974), particular features and routes (Lynch, 1960), and landscapes generally (Peterson, 1967). Models of human spatial behaviour need no longer be restricted to economic cost or physical proximity, but can also take into account nonmaterial aspects of the decision to travel, visit, use, and revere. Humanism thus "sought to overcome the narrow methodological constraints of positivist logic and science in order to pursue questions of esthetic, literary, linguistic, ethical, and historical meanings" (Ley and Samuels, 1978, p 5). In this manner, planning can become a humane activity, as it seeks to provide the very best quality of life for urban inhabitants (Bunge, 1963), maintain a fine balance between user demands and the needs of conservation in rural areas (Linton, 1968; Leopold, 1969; Hopkinson, 1971), temper the effects of large-scale construction projects through user-preferred design strategies, avoid the disamenity of ugliness or visual blight (Lewis *et al.*, 1973), and incorporate the needs of the disadvantaged in designing the built environment (Rowles, 1978; Hill, 1981, 1982).

The central concern that linked all these arguments for humanism in geography was for the fate of the individual human being in an increasingly complicated environment or, if one prefers, questions as to the quality of life' (Hägerstrand, 1970, p 7). Man was again to be re-situated - literally re-placed - in the centre of geography and his world, along with his works, attitudes, and ideas, as both a producer and a product of his world and also to augment the human experience by a more intensive, hence self-conscious, reflection upon the meaning of being human" (Ley and Samuels, 1978, p 7). An active view of man was to be the central tenet of humanistic geography (Ley, 1980).

The development of this position required of its protagonists, at the very least, some display of competence in the burgeoning literature (largely outside of geography) dealing with man's relationship to world, nature, and landscape. It required, in other words, that geographers become familiar with literature from the arts, anthropology, architecture, history, literature, philosophy, political science, and sociology.

(ii) Philosophical underpinnings

From philosophy, two related challenges to positivism were brought to bear on the debate with positivism. Jean-Paul Sartre had argued that we cannot begin with an assumption of some definable 'human nature' which underlies man. Instead, man is nothing more than how he acts and what he does. Man is that being who is forced to choose and to act without appeal to any concept of human nature that guarantees the correctness or rightness of his choice and the efficacy of his action. Existentialism thus begins with man as an active agent in the world; that "existence precedes essence" means that one must take subjectivity as his point of departure" (Sartre, 1946, p 17). Man's freedom is rooted in this subjectivity. According to this position the Cartesian cogito (consciousness) becomes the only possible point of departure for a truly human science.

The second philosophical influence is less easy to pinpoint, and cannot be attributed to the influence of any one philosophy or school. Its roots lie in the radical recognition of the role of history and temporality, and is exemplified in the philosophies of Hegel, Marx and Heidegger, and in a practical sense in the recent and growing interest in Michel Foucault's studies of the history of science (1970), of unreason and insanity (1973), and of sexuality (1980). Here, man's contemporary being can be understood only within the context of interacting forces and changing attitudes; a context in which existing possibilities arise because other possibilities have been closed off. In geography the renaissance of historical geography is informed by this position, particularly from the historical materialism of Marx and contemporary neo-Marxist theory (Gregory, 1978a, 1978b, 1981; Baker and Gregory, 1984).

From disparate influences geographers began to articulate (some would argue that they began to re-articulate) a geography of the human world. Nature, man and culture were to be seen as more than material to provide data for analysis. Meaning and interpretation were fundamental to understanding this world. In a similar way to that in which 'resource' had earlier come to be regarded, not as a fixed entity, but as a product of technology and socially ascribed value, humanistic geography began to see the earth, land, society, and space in terms of culturally, socially and individually structured sets of meanings. These varied between culture groups and, as behavioural geography had shown, they also varied at the level of individual perception. Looking back we can see these claims as on the one hand, a critique of the claims of science to be the only true knowledge, and on the other hand an argument supporting what Schutz referred to as 'multiple realities'. Both claims were important, but inadequate on their own. Science had to be re-situated within its methodological limits and within the life context from which it arises and gains its meaning, and the multiple realities of different cultural and social worlds had to be shown not to be an argument for relativism. Thus, phenomenology became the central approach, among others, wherein geographers sought to ground these multiple realities within the paramount reality of the everyday life-world (Relph, 1970; Tuan, 1971; Mercer and Powell, 1972; Buttimer, 1974, 1976; Entrikin, 1976).

(iii) The need for critique

If humanism and humanistic geography have achieved the recognition that we must begin with man at the centre of his world, they have however placed a particular view of man before us. In the urgency of overcoming the determinism of economic models of man and society, humanistic geography has readily adopted an anthropocentric and voluntaristic conception of man. Man is subject and his knowledge is subjective and personal. From this 'cogito' the world is created. Study of the world is to be through the reenactment of the thoughts and deeds of this thinking man. As David Ley (1983, p 268) has argued an adequate conceptualization of social action, if it is to escape voluntarism, requires also an adequate view of a multidimensional environment which both enables and constrains human intentionality". Without such a recognition of freedom within constraints the dangers of naive relativism and reductionistic materialism are ever present.

If we have learned anything about positivism and research method from the protracted debates in geography over the past two decades it is the idea that science does not deal with 'brute' facts in a disinterested manner. In its most extreme forms the claim to objectivity merely hides the assumptions which every society and its sciences make, and tends to legitimize these unexamined notions. In other words, it tends to perpetuate the status quo. The philosophy of geographic thought is currently undergoing an important transformation as the implications of this rejection of objectivism spread into all areas of the discipline; it becomes philosophical and critical.

If we are to understand the role of humanism in geography in ways other than straightforwardly recounting the main claims and arguments made by individual geographers, we will have to reflect critically on the basic or fundamental categories assumed in the debate over humanism. Not all these issues can be clarified before we look at the works of geographers in detail, but critical categories can be outlined by way of introduction.

Is it science?

To this day geographers have failed to agree upon whether the discipline is a science, an art, or one of the humanities. To some extent the importance of this issue has faded recently as scholars begin to recognize the common experiences and impulses behind the creative act (Ghiselin, 1952), the imaginative leap necessary for thoughtful work in all three areas (Judson, 1980; Polkinghorne, 1983, p 13) and the necessity for an historical perspective (Tuan, 1976a). However, the issue has thus far not been dealt with satisfactorily. If we are to understand the claims made for and against humanism in geography we will have to clarify these three domains of inquiry. Specifically we will have to distinguish between the 'humanities' (Latin: *humanitas*) and 'humanism' (German: *humanismus*).

What is a humanist?

The label 'humanist' or 'humanistic' has been claimed at various times by those who claim to study the humanities (Tuan, 1978), by those whose concern is with the art of geography (Meinig, 1983), and by those whose theoretical approach is concerned with the truly human (Harvey, 1974; Gregory, 1978a; Ley, 1980). Others have criticized this appropriation, and argued that a scientist may also be a humanist (Morrill, 1983, p 69). More recently, social

geography, based firmly in the social science tradition, has chosen to label its own work 'humanistic' in an attempt to get back to the forgotten man: to resituate (re-place) man at the centre of his geographic world (Ley and Samuels, 1978; Smith, S.J., 1981; Jackson, P., 1981; Jackson, P. and Smith, 1984). Far from being a single movement then, 'humanism' itself represents a multiplicity of interpretations of man, society and science.

What is the 'idiographic'?

In bringing science, art, and the humanities into sharp focus, and in showing how humanism and the humanities must, in some sense, be distinguished, we shall be in a position to raise serious questions about the distinction between the idiographic and the nomothetic. This dichotomy underpins all geographic writing. Yet in this monograph we shall see how it is a misleading, albeit convenient, opposition. This will have further significance for the way in which we can interpret claims about humanism.

Subjectivism

Linked to the previous issues is the question of subjectivism. The universal acceptance of the idiographic and nomothetic as polar opposites has resulted in an almost universal interpretation of human behaviour as individualist, personalist, and subjectivist. While geographers have discussed the pros and cons of subjective and individualistic approaches to inquiry (Olsson, 1983), few have come to grips with the significance of this issue in a broader context (see, for example, Harvey, 1972, 1974; Smith, 1979). The origins of this issue go back to the dualistic world-view of Descartes, within which the methodical search for laws is to overcome the deception of the senses" of everyday knowledge, and where atomistic individuals can be aggregated to produce statistical regularities. More recently the crux of the matter rests on the individualism of classical liberalism, and the model of human nature that has become universally accepted in the sciences and the arts in western thought. This is the ontology, epistemology, and the methodology that founds modern thought, and in particular frames the limits of discussion in geography.

The division between singular and aggregate experiences has been very important in framing the discussion about humanistic geography in two particular ways.

- a. It has led humanists to argue that the humanistic approach is somehow preparatory for 'scientific' research. As Tuan (1976a) argues: "Humanistic geography contributes to science by drawing out the facts hitherto beyond the scientific purview"; it is a form of archaeology which recovers personal, complex, or ambiguous experiences, and thereby provides the raw material for formalization and empirical investigation.
- b. More importantly, geographers have fully accepted the atomistic conception of reality that derives from empiricism. Statistical regularities or law-like relations are derived from the aggregation of individual behaviours and responses. Thus until recently, when geographers have discussed structures or categories, only two options have been seen to be available: personal, subjective (and hence idiographic, unreliable, unscientific) or empirically generalizable aggregations (that is, nomothetic, reliable, scientific). We should not be surprised that, against this background, alternative philosophical and methodological approaches which need to deal with structures and categories as

dialectical (Marxism), as formal (Q-analysis, or non-relativistic moral arguments), as deep, hidden structures (materialism, psychoanalysis), or as formal a priori or universal (Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology) are given little credence or are misinterpreted by the received views. Alternative views are forced to legitimize their own arguments on the ground of empiricism or subjectivism, and thereby concatenate their claims with those they need to transcend.

I have referred to these issues as fundamental because they operate as the backcloth for the claims made for humanism in geography (and for geographic discourse generally). They further influence the range of arguments the discipline has been willing to accept (and publish), and those it has closed off from consideration. They are categories in the sense that they seem to operate as universal structures of thought and discourse, which constrain the direction humanism has taken in geography. Radical reflection on these fundamental categories is, then, not merely an exercise in criticism. It is essential to a clear interpretation of the role of, and limits upon, humanism in geography. Arguments in favour of, and in opposition to, humanism in geography operate within these limits. If we are to penetrate the debates which surround this issue, we must be sure to clarify this set of presuppositions first.

From the sixteenth century on we see the beginnings of the modern world-view based on science, method, and detached observation. The 'observer' epistemology that results is replayed in different forms in the intervening years as objectivism, positivism, and the scientism it spawns. To Heidegger's and Habermas's arguments that we are all positivists, we could also add that the history of humanism is also an invisible burden carried by all subsequent discourse. Both positions, positivism and humanism, frame the coordinates of the humanist movement in the 1970s, and continue to frame the limits of attempts, of which this is one, to move beyond objectivism and scientism on the one hand, and subjectivism and relativism on the other.

This monograph will take the reader up to the debate between the role of human agency and structure, which is perhaps the most interesting theoretical issue in geography at the moment. From that point it will not attempt to press further, with the exception of some closing remarks regarding the subjectivist assumptions that still underlie much of this debate, and which will have to be raised as a question if we are to evaluate the future possibilities for and possible configuration of such a humanism.

II WHAT IS HUMANISM?

In his discussion of humanism Fowler (1983, p 240) argues that: The word is apt to puzzle or mislead". Certainly when we turn to the ways in which the words 'humanism', 'humanistic', and the 'humanities' have been used in the claims about geographic research, the precise meaning of each often escapes us, even though we may feel we understand the way they are used. At times we may feel like the reader in Fowler's account:

The...reader sometimes gets the impression that 'humanist' means a great classical scholar.... Another time he gathers that a humanist is a sceptic or an agnostic or a free-thinker or something of the sort.... Another time he feels sure that a humanist

is a Positivist or Comtist, and here at last, since he knows that Comte founded the Religion of Humanity, there seems to be some reason in the name. And lastly he occasionally realizes that his writer is using the word in the sense in which he might have invented it for himself - one for whom the proper study of mankind is man, the student, and especially the kindly or humane student, of human nature. (Fowler, 1983, p 240)

The Oxford English Dictionary helps little in this regard since it merely gives four meanings under 'humanism'. Humanism is: (i) the belief in the humanity of Christ; (ii) the character or quality of being human; (iii) any system of thought or action which is concerned with merely human interests (as distinguished from divine), or with those of the human race in general; the 'Religion of Humanity'; and (iv) devotion to those studies which promote human culture; literary culture; especially the system of the Humanists; the study of the Roman and Greek classics which came into vogue at the Renaissance.

Humanitas - explicitly called - first became a goal to strive for during the age of the Roman Republic. *Homo humanus* was contrasted with *homo barbarus*. *Homo humanus* thus meant those cultured and civilized people - the Romans - who held scholarship and training in good conduct in high esteem. This notion of education (Greek: *paideia*) taken over from the Greeks thus understood became *humanitas* (humanities). The *studium humanitatis*, or the study of the humanities, reaches back to the ancients, as a historically understood humanism (Heidegger, 1977, p 200). *Humanitas* (Latin) came to mean mental cultivation and liberal education, and is associated closely with culture and civilization (Williams, 1976, p 121). Indeed, in medieval usage 'humanity' had the same meaning as courtesy and politeness. From the fifteenth century onwards this developed in Christian thought as a form of learning distinct from divinity. Thus by 1605 Bacon argued that there are three types of knowledge; Divine, Natural and Human (Humanities). The historical nature of this type of knowledge led to its association with the classics, and by the eighteenth century the humanities' (from the French form) had become a common term to represent historical and classical scholarship (Williams, 1976, p 122).

But humanism also derives from the early sixteenth century Renaissance use of *umanista* to refer not only to classical learning but also to the student of human activities. This usage carries the meaning of concern for man's humanity and his freedom to fulfill this humanity. The eighteenth century German formation of *humanismus* also reflects this concern for human development and perfection. However, these meanings carry an essential ambiguity. The meaning of 'man's humanity' and 'freedom' mean different things to different people and in different contexts. Interpretations of the 'nature' of man and 'freedom' produce several types of humanism such as scientific humanism (Comte), Marxist humanism (Georg Lukacs, Leszek Kolakowski), socialist or secular humanism (Erich Fromm, Maurice Merleau-Ponty), Sartre's existential humanism, and Christian and Jewish humanism (Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Ellul). Each conceives of man's humanity in distinct ways, each lays claim to a different form of humanism (Table 1).

Table 1. Interpreting man's humanity

Form of humanism	Nature of man
Pragmatic	An anthropocentric view of man, where man is the measure of all things
Personalistic (spiritualistic)	Affirms man's capacity to contemplate the eternal truths
Existential	The only world is the human world - the world of human subjectivity
Marxist	Man is currently alienated from himself, resulting from the commoditization of labour, private ownership of resources, and capitalist forms of social and economic organization

(i) Liberalism and the origins of humanism

It may seem strange to begin discussion of humanism and geography with classical liberalism. Yet the tradition of received ideas within which a discipline like geography sits is the tradition of classical liberalism. To this day it remains the basis of modern thought; we are still children of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason. In everyday usage liberalism sometimes refers to unorthodox, progressive or radical political ideas. But as a doctrine liberalism is based on individualist theories of man and society (Williams, 1976, p 150). It refers to the political, legal, economic, and social values and doctrines of capitalism. It assumes that society is an association of human beings, functioning in large part individually. It is thus in fundamental conflict with social and socialist theories. Its roots are deep and complex, but we can see its origins in part in the newly found confidence of man in his ability to understand and control the forces of nature from the fifteenth century onwards., In natural science the fifteenth and sixteenth century achievements of Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were followed during the seventeenth century by Hobbes's and Locke's attempts to establish comparably certain knowledge about human nature. With the Enlightenment the power of reason to comprehend and create the world becomes firmly established.

From the seventeenth century onwards social institutions were constructed through the lenses of bourgeois rationality: on the one hand, the adoption of private property, economic individualism, intellectual freedom, and political and legal equality (Rossides, 1978, 4-5); on the other hand, the institutionalization and confinement of unreason (Foucault, 1965; Lasch, 1979, 369-370). The norms of social control fragmented, and state and private institutions were increasingly accepted as necessary to coordinate and plan for a society comprising atomistic social agents. By the nineteenth century ideas of individual liberty, political-legal equality, private property, contract, profit and self-equilibrating exchange economy were being institutionalized in a number of western countries. In economics the theory of 'laissez faire' arose, and in politics the theory of natural rights.

The extremes that resulted from nineteenth century individualism in industry and economy have been well documented and are well known (for example, Thompson, 1966). These forced many liberal theorists to reconsider the role of institutional management in the creation of social order. John Stuart Mill in England and John Dewey in America, among others, began to address politics as others had previously addressed science and business. Some measure of state action was necessary to safeguard people from the excesses of economic and individual freedoms.

By the nineteenth century several critical values and doctrines had thus become established:

- a. Man operates as a free individual.
- b. Society and economies operate most effectively when open and free, as the product of independent, individual action.
- c. Values such as private property, freedom of action, and profit were fundamental to the 'natural' operation of such economies and societies.
- d. Benevolent state action was to oversee and safeguard the interests of the individual against the excesses of others.

Liberalism thus espouses certain necessary freedoms, but these are founded on a possessive individualism. As a pejorative term, liberalism has been widely used by socialists and Marxists to convey a sense of lack of rigour and a sentimentality in belief. In not being an explicitly critical social philosophy it is seen to be conservative. Indeed George Will (1982, p 202), the conservative American critic, argues that there are two major themes in modern Western conservatism. He characterizes these as on the one hand a reaction against the mechanism of social engineering, in favour of a more organic understanding of society. On the other hand is a concern with the protection of society and the autonomy of social groups against the political state and politicized control. This comes very close to the underlying motivation which stirred much early humanistic geography. Like all ideas, socio-political views cannot be divorced from what Habermas (1971) has referred to as 'interests', nor from what we may broadly conceive of as a set of world views and philosophical positions. Thus, historically we find developing along with the above notions, and serving to shore them up against criticism from opposing viewpoints, an extension of empiricist epistemologies, and the demise of earlier forms of rationalism. More specifically we see the rise of positivism.

(ii) The critique of positivism

Broadly, positivism is the belief that human beings can rationally understand and control phenomena" (Rossides, 1976, p 8). Put another way, positivism refers to the continuing attempt by western thinkers to bring human nature within the jurisdiction of reason, or, more recently, of science. Human beings are no longer to be seen as creatures of custom, of the passions, living in an unpredictable world co-inhabited with the gods. This view is implicit in Descartes's reflections on the nature of reality, and is integrally bound up in the notions of method he bequeathed to modern science. Here certainty was to provide the only sound basis for scientific knowledge. Conjectures had no place in the face of clear and assured reasoning, nor had speculative thought in the face of practical knowledge which we can use, as do artisans, to "make ourselves the masters and possessors of nature" (Descartes, 1965, 24-50). The rules of method required that we avoid bias and prejudice, and that each individual rely

solely for evidence on what could be established with certainty. Work was to progress without haste (for "those who walk very slowly can go ahead much further, if they always follow the right path, than those who run but stray from it (p 4)). This could be achieved only through adoption of a methodological atomism, whereby the problem faced was divided into as many parts as possible, beginning with the "simplest and easiest objects to understand, in order to climb little by little, gradually to the knowledge of the most complex" (p 16). Such procedures require that we presume order among the parts, and such an atomistic methodology provided the exactness of inquiry necessary to overcome the deception of the senses".

Geographic humanism sits alongside this view of positivism within the individualist tradition of liberalism. Yet it has refused to accept positivism's own claims about what constitutes acceptable evidence and certain knowledge. It should be no surprise to find that since the 1960s, environmental perception and cognitive behavioural research have found themselves situated uncomfortably between a 'reconstituted positivism' on the one hand and humanism on the other (Downs, 1979; Bunting and Guelke, 1979). In this situation the projects of perception research and humanism were concatenated, as they attempted to retrieve human being from the limited models of human behaviour adopted in positivistic research, but within an established intellectual tradition (Western liberalism). Only recently has a more radical critique of both positivism and its underlying individualist assumptions been undertaken in which the claims of humanism do not sit so easily within the liberal tradition of subjective individualism and the research agenda of cognitive behaviouralism.

If then the 'quantitative revolution' - the quantitative juggernaut of spatial analysis" (Ley, 1981b, p 250) - was a turn away from *qualifactus* (Fig. 1), and the world of custom, the passions, and the subjective, then the initial claims for humanism in geography were aimed to recover critical elements of *qualifactus* from the abstract, non-human world of geometry and *quantifactus*.

The determinism, economism, and abstraction of the early quantitative publications seemed to abolish human intentionality, culture, and man himself" (Ley, 1981b, p 250). Gault (1941, p 548) had earlier voiced the need for research that would restore "man and his mind to their proper sphere as purposive and active elements rather than passive agents", in opposition to the mechanical concepts which were increasingly being accepted. Humanism sought to refocus attention on the distinctively human components of mind, consciousness, values, or more briefly perception" (Ley, 1981b, p 250).

The growing interest in humanistic approaches was based on a desire to retrieve 'human being' from the abstract and reductionist models that permeated the discipline; to focus attention solidly on human experience, as well as behaviour (Ley, 1980; Claval, 1983). These included the influence of choice on spatial behaviour (Wolpert, 1964); preferences (Gould, 1966; Gould and White, 1974); aesthetic and artistic judgements (Lowenthal, 1968); quality of life (Bunge, 1973a; Hagerstrand, 1970); meaning and values (Buttimer, 1974); images and cognitive maps (Downs and Stea, 1973). More broadly Tuan (1975; 1977) refers to the geography of experience, or experiential geography, and Ley (1981a) and Jackson and Smith (1984) speak of the philosophies of meaning which inform ethnomethodological and *verstehen* approaches to humanistic geography.



Figure 1.

III THE ORIGINS OF HUMANISTIC GEOGRAPHY

The physical science background of many geographers in the early and middle parts of this century has been attributed as a direct influence on the elemental approach that developed in human geography up until the 1970s, and with it the forms of accepted evidence and method.

In America, human geographers studied house types and field patterns, described and classified settlement types, and traced the diffusion of individual plants, animals, and items of material culture. Man was examined principally by studying the objects around him; objects were surrogates for man. Thus, farmers were explored through their barns and fields, rather than through their decisions, values, or behavior...

(English and Mayfield, 1972, p 212)

Duncan (1980) has extended this critique to argue that even the concept of culture adopted in human geography lacks an active view of man. It is the recognition of the absence of human agency that leads geographers to investigate the possibilities of a more human geography by studying men and not merely artifacts. In part this builds upon J.K. Wright's (1947) work on the role of geographical knowledge of all kinds and Lowenthal's (1961) work on the role of the imagination. Wright (1947) had argued that the imagination was fundamental both to the practice of geography and to the subject matter of the discipline. Referring to the study of geographical knowledge and belief (both past and present) as 'geosophy', this form of human geography:

covers the geographical ideas, both true and false, of all manner of people - not only geographers, but farmers and fishermen, business executives and poets, novelists and painters, Bedouins and Hottentots - and for this reason it necessarily has to do in large degree with subjective conceptions. (Wright, 1947, p 83)

Geography was necessarily concerned with human desires, motives and prejudices. But such a geography required a fundamental rethinking of the philosophy of the discipline. In particular, it required a theory of knowledge and of experience. This was the task of Lowenthal's (1961) *Geography, experience, and imagination: towards a geographical epistemology*, in which he developed Wright's claims into a systematic reflection on the "relation between the world outside and the picture in our heads". The subject matter of geography was to be located in the everyday world: "the world of general discourse; the palpable present".

The main concern of geography, Lowenthal argued, is with knowledge and ideas about man and milieu. In their range of interests and capacities geographers reflect man's concerns generally, and to a greater extent than other more specialized disciplines. It follows that "anyone who inspects the world around him is in some measure a geographer". The theme of everyman as geographer becomes important from this point on. If all are geographers then professional geography sits with the problem of the variation in geographic knowledge between people. This requires an account of how man knows. Lowenthal deals with this account by suggesting that individual knowledge is finite, and the information required in a lifetime is miniscule compared with the milieu, with its vast array of scientific knowledge.

Wright's (1947, 73-74) claim that geography deals with subjective, as well as objective knowledge leads Lowenthal (1961, p 231) to the classical problem of epistemology: how conceptions of the milieu correspond to it as it actually is? While it is necessary that "the picture of the world in our head" be consistent with the "world outside", "a perfect fit between the outside world and our views of it is not possible". Knowledge of the world differs between people of different cultures, social groups, individuals, and even between the same person as a child and as an adult, or when in different moods. Each individual life constitutes an original and irreversible perceptible experience. Consequently experience is unique and self-centred. It is influenced by culture, language, physiology, imagination, memory, and personal experience, but in a way which makes every perception and every experience unique and individual. Human geography must begin to take responsibility for dealing with such "irreducibly unique" world-views. A geography which treats only the world of facts seems arid and lifeless, lacking colour, experience and variety. Geography is thus experiential and interpretative, a search for truth which involves reflection on the immediate and the self-evident.

(i) The behavioural revolution

If the modern period of interest in an active concept of man in geography was marked by the landmark papers of J.K. Wright (1947) and David Lowenthal (1961), as late as 1967 Lowenthal could still note that geography was still undisturbed by its neglect of experience. By 1970 several authors (Gauld, 1942; Hagerstrand, 1970; Harvey, 1969; Parsons, 1969; Downs, 1970) had pointed to the need for a more humane geography, where human behaviour and decision-making were to be incorporated into models of economic and spatial patterns. Traditional black-box models of man either assumed a rational economic man of classical economics, or man was seen as a *tabula rasa* on which stimulus-response mechanisms operated: environment, history, market opportunities, built form. These were to be re-thought (Downs, 1970, p 68). In these models man was dealt with as an unknown constant: a product of stochastic processes, classical economic theory, social physics, or behaviourist psychology. A more humane geography was needed because the stochastic operations of diffusion modelling failed to take account of the biography of individuals acting in space (Gauld, 1941; Hagerstrand, 1970). Thus "[t]he 'behavioural revolution' [out of which many of these claims initially spring] represents a fundamental change in our conceptual approach to understanding human spatial behaviour, and is characterized by a more realistic view of man" (Downs, 1970, p 68).

Humanism's concern for the extension of parameters or the widening of the model of man, with which geographers sought to understand the world began with cognitive behaviouralism as a widening of the parameters of spatial analysis. David Harvey (1969), for example, argued that geography's concern with spatial distribution and location theory had been based on unsatisfactory mechanistic models of man. Since "locational patterns in human geography are the physical expressions of individual human actions, locational analysis must therefore incorporate some notions regarding human decision making" (Harvey, 1969, p 35). One of the three possible directions to remedy this situation was the incorporation of the cognitive processes involved in the act of decision. Such processes allow man to give meaning to the environment: "to add distinctions and relations to the physical or objective properties of environments" (Gould, 1973, p 62).




Figure 2. A conceptual scheme for research into geographic space perception. From Downs (1970).

Although much research in behavioural geography assumes stimulus-response mechanisms, environmental perception was to be more than mere stimulus-response psychology. Geographers had only recently put behind them the acrimonious debates over environmental determinism and human freedom of action, and were unlikely to knowingly accept another determinism. Cognitive behaviouralism was to be distinguished from behaviourism (stimulus-response psychology), cognition from perception, and image and cognitive map from mere pictorial mental representation. Human behaviour was a complex activity which could be better understood if we could comprehend the workings of mind, memory, and experience - of cognition and knowing. Until 1970, work in this area had focused upon one of three major approaches: the investigation of the structure of geographic space perception and orientation (Trowbridge, 1913; Lynch, 1960; Lucas, 1964); the evaluation of environmental and spatial images as a prerequisite to understanding decision making and behaviour (White, 1945; Burton and Kates, 1964; Saarinen, 1966); and the analysis of preferences for particular regions (Gould, 1966, 1967) and places (Wolpert, 1965). In his seminal review essay in 1970, Roger Downs clarified these ideas, and by adapting Kirk's (1951) views of the relationship between the behavioural and phenomenal environments provided a succinct model of environmental cognition (Fig. 2). In this model man is viewed as a decision-maker, or complex information processor, whose behaviour is some function of the image of the real world he or she holds. Perception and image form the intervening variables between the world and the decision to act in it. Information is derived from the real world, and is received by the individual through a system of perceptual receptors. The meaning of the information is a product of the value system and the image of the real world already held by the particular individual. This meaning may change the already existing image, and thus the individual may adjust himself with respect to the real world. Decisions and further actions or behaviour may thus follow. Behaviour is seen here as an ongoing series of interactions and feedbacks between the image and the real world, the image readjusting itself to the information it has about the world, and man changing his

Table 2. Models of man in geographic thought

Geographic theory:	Spectrum of Assumptions:	Educational/Psychological Theory
Social physics Classical economics Locational analysis Spatial analysis	Human behaviour can be predicted and controlled. Scientific inquiry is possible and validity can be demonstrated	CLASSICAL BEHAVIOURISM (Pavlov, Watson, Locke)
Choice (Wolpert) Normative location models (Weber, Von Thunen, Losch) Preference (Gould)		NEOBHAVIOURISM (Skinner)
Cognitive behaviouralism (Downs)	Human behaviour is abstract in nature, and is composed of a complex of variables. It cannot be predicted or easily controlled. This impossibility of prediction does not mean that behaviour cannot be studied, and lawful and dependable characteristics demonstrated.	COGNITIVE LEARNING THEORY
Humanistic geography (Tuan, Entrikin)	Human behaviour is complex and unpredictable. Laws of behaviour cannot be established. Instead inquiry is to investigate the richness of lived experience or the meaning given to behaviour by social actors.	HUMANISM
Humanistic geography (Buttimer, Seamon) (Meinig)		
Idealism (Guelke)		IDEALISM
behaviour in the world or changing the world as his ability to handle this information alters (Table 2).		

(ii) The rise of epistemological problems

Even in the works of J.K. Wright (1942; 1947, 73-81) the human world of experience and behaviour was situated within the domain of subjective understanding. Maps, exploration, and *terrae incognitae* were the subjective sides of an objective world. The task of the geographer was to understand the coded nature of the subjective world in order to better understand its relationship with the 'real' world. Subjective and objective knowledge (Kirk's (1951) behavioural and phenomenal worlds, Downs' (1970) cognitive and behavioural worlds) were two aspects of the geographical domain. Interior

and exterior worlds were presupposed. Behavioural theory dealt with the spatial environment itself, the information or stimulus set, the intervening cognitive processes, and the group and individual differences in the operation of these processes" (Downs and Stea, 1973, p 7).

The central theme of much work in environmental perception and behavioural geography is the intervention of these cognitive processes between man and his environment, which allows him to give meaning to what he sees: to add distinctions and relations to the physical or objective properties of environments" (Golledge, 1973, p 63). Research indicated that what exists in the objective environment and what people conceive the environment to be, differ (Golledge, 1973, p 62). Spatial structure and behavioural patterns could not then be understood without some knowledge of the perception of spatial reality retained in the human mind" (Cox and Golledge, 1981, p xvi).

Problems peculiar to the researcher attempting to search for theory in geography arise from the fact that he must be interested not only in the external physical environment and the internalizing of human actions, but also with the interface between the two. This raises the entire problem of how to represent cognitive and physical worlds, and how to use behavioural processes to explain overt activity in the physical world. (Golledge, 1973, p 64)

Golledge is left with an inevitable and perplexing question - 'what is reality?' what is the relationship between objective reality and the world inside our heads? How can we determine the relationship between man in the world and the world in man? (Golledge, 1979). What is the philosophical distinction between real and perceived environments? (Cox and Golledge, 1981, p xx).

Many of those arguing in favour of a humanistic form of geography began their research in this tradition of environmental perception and behavioural geography, and many still operate within it (see for example the recently published collected essays *Environmental perception and behavior: an inventory and prospect* edited by Saarinen, Seamon, and Sell, 1984). Just as the cognitive behaviouralists argued that spatial models must take account of human informational environments within which decisions are made, the humanists argued that all human inquiry must recognize its moral responsibility of treating what is 'human' in that world, instead of reducing such phenomena to physical surrogates which can be more easily modelled. Thus humanists sought to explicate the whole of lived experience (Buttimer, 1974, p 37). Scientific procedures "which separate 'subjects' and 'objects', thought and action, people and environment are inadequate to investigate this lifeworld" (Buttimer, 1976, p 277). Spatial analysis and other positivist techniques may adequately describe the upper levels of social reality, but the deeper we probe into this reality the less well-suited are these objective scientific methods, and the more we need to resort to other methods: specifically we need phenomenology (Tuan, 1974, p 57).

But if these early claims to an explicitly humanistic geography (Buttimer, 1976; Entrikin, 1976; Tuan, 1976a) were for a form of inquiry that was not science, and did not use scientific methods, what kind of knowledge did it offer? A.J. Ayer (1952) had already stated (and many geographers had come to accept) that only statements about sense-data

(i.e., in practice observational data) were meaningful. All other claims were literally "sense-less" (and hence meaningless). If humanism was to reject science and experimental method it would have to withstand severe criticism from positivism, and it would have to give a sound accounting of its own methodology and philosophy. This accounting is still underway on two levels: first, on the level of epistemology (the way in which humanism knows) and methodology (the way in which such knowing can be demonstrated). This is the subject of Chapters V and VI. For the moment we must turn to a third justification for humanism - the moral imperative.

IV THE CRITIQUE OF THE RELEVANCE CLAIM

Tune into any discussion amongst geographers and as likely as not the discussion unfolds from the standpoint of the benevolent bureaucrat - a person who knows better than other people and who will therefore make better decisions for others than they will be able to make for themselves. (Harvey, D., 1974, p 22)

(i) The moral imperative

One change in external circumstances which further affected the direction of humanism in geography was concern about the scientism which dominated spatial analysis. As we have seen, humanist arguments focused on the reductionism, objectivism and lack of holistic viewpoint with which this approach operated. Two other related concerns were important.

- a. By the 1970s geographers demanded that their research be relevant, not merely in the formulation of abstract theory, but increasingly in the interests of applied science. This demand arose from a faith in abstract science, in economic growth, cybernetics, technological solutions and managerial rationality (Smith, D.M., 1983, p 128). It was a faith in the geographer as mechanic, and it assumed that "changes in spatial organization lead to social change and ultimately to a better world, more fair and more efficient" (Olsson, 1983, p 83). Such optimism has remained central to spatial analysis. It is science "that has amassed the vast knowledge of societal and physical processes, that has liberated so many from superstition, and made possible through technology and organization an escape from slavery, poverty and disease" (Morrill, 1983, 67-68). Here was a 'brave new world' in which postwar geography could participate in the rational (scientific) reconstruction of society (Morrill, 1983; see the interview with Peter Hall in Browning, 1982, 57-74). It was to be a modern urban, even postmodern world, transformed by new technologies (Abler *et al.*, 1975) and industrial processes (Berry, 1973), in which social problems could be dealt with clearly and rationally. Furthermore, it was a world about which the geographer had something to say, and a world in which he was listened to.
- b. Linked to this first point, geographers began to realize that the claims scientists made were indeed beginning to have direct influence on policy decisions. Not only were the findings of science relevant, but they were being used to forge new places. Ted Relph (1976; 1981) has continued to bring this situation graphically to our attention with his discussion of the increasing placelessness of modern urban

environments. The cult of efficiency and profit combined in an extreme rationalism to destroy humane places and create in their stead 'machine' places or placelessness. In the design of such consumer spaces science was an important partner.

By the late 1960s the promise of applied geography had become the focus of penetrating criticism. The earlier demands for 'relevance' were now matched by questions about who would be served by such 'relevant' research, and to what purposes it was to be put (Parsons, 1969, p 188). Was geography merely a form of instrumental rationality (like the field of planning with which it had increasingly aligned itself) or was it more than this? Even if it was concerned primarily with instrumental reason, how were aesthetics, human values, and the sense of place to be incorporated into master plans for particular places? In this regard research into landscape assessment and evaluation techniques is illustrative. The central goal of this work was the evaluation of intangible aspects of landscape in order to give landscape quality equal weight with cost-benefit analyses, mineral resource surveys, and economic impact studies in regional plans and resource inventories (Lucas, 1963).

In part, this initial criticism from humanism remained merely a challenge to develop better techniques. As late as 1983 Morrill (1983, 68-69) argued that:

A humanistic approach can broaden and enliven a science of geography by much improving the questions asked; the variety of facts observed and treated; and the quality and completeness of theories constructed. It is not then 'anti-science', but 'science liberating'.... The humanist critique does not knock down the house of science, but it does reveal the simplicity and crudeness of the present edifice, revealed by objective analysis.

One immediate consequence was the investigation of a much wider variety of methods and approaches to research, such as narrative description and interpretative commentary (Seaman, 1979b; Eyles, 1985), historical analysis (Harris, 1978), alternative mappings of human experience (Wood, 1973, 1977, 1978a, 1978b), participant observation techniques (Jackson, 1983), as well as a vast array of statistical techniques, as geographers attempted to build more reliable predictors of environmental and spatial behaviour into their research.

However, beyond this 'humanizing' of predictive science geographers began to recognize that the goal of predictability in model building was itself illusory, and where it could be achieved for practical purposes it required so many assumptions as to make the resultant models socially unacceptable.

The promise of predictability, the test and crown of intellectual achievement (i.e., science), is proving increasingly illusory in human affairs. Research results are seldom commensurable with the sophistication of the techniques used. The most respected authorities often do little better than the star-gazers. Man, as it turns out, does not always behave rationally, moreover, changes and reversals of trends, of values, of goals are rarely foreseeable. (Parsons, 1969, p 188)

Such criticisms were not founded solely on methodological inadequacy, but also on the judgement that this form of knowledge was morally questionable and that the applications it gave rise to, far from enriching the social world, resulted in further constraints on the freedom of action. "What initially had presented itself under the disguise of humane methodology now appeared as crude, inhuman and power-ridden ideology. What our elders had told us to be emancipatory we found out to be the opposite" (Olsson, 1983, p 83).

Like the game of 'cheat the prophet' described by G.K. Chesterton in *The Napoleon of Notting Hill*, the players listen intently to the clever men who predict what will happen in the next generation. They wait until all the clever men are dead and buried, then they go and do something else.

That is all. For a race of simple tastes, however, it is great fun." More recently, as the prophets and the prophecies increase in number the game begins to lose its fun, since it becomes more and more difficult to elude all of them. "When a man did something free and frantic and entirely on his own, a horrible thought struck him afterwards; it might have been predicted. Whenever a duke climbed a lamp-post, when a dean got drunk, he could not really be happy, he could not be certain that he was not fulfilling some prophecy" (quoted in Will, 1982, p 180).

The chauvinism of such a self-important predictive science led Gunnar Olsson and David Harvey, in particular, to raise critical questions about the implications such changes in social planning would have on social relations. More recently Olsson has couched the role of the planner in the metaphor of violation: a "phallic symbol whereby the present penetrates the future" (Olsson, 1983, p 76). Such planning, in seeking "to preserve what now is by ensuring that current intentions are turned into the stones of physical and institutional structures ... interferes deeply into the dialectic between society and individual" (Olsson, 1983, p 76). For Harvey (1974) the question was; how can geographers contribute meaningfully and directly to the formation of public policy? Three fundamental questions are at issue: what kind of geography are we to have? what kind of public policy? and, implicit in these, for what kind of society?

The geographer's imperative to action seems to stem from several motives: personal ambition, disciplinary imperialism, social necessity, and moral obligation (Harvey, 1974, p 19). The historical relationship of geography to the technics and mechanics of the management of Empire became after the second world war (and with the breakup of the Empire) a concern with the technics and mechanics of urban, regional and environmental management". In this latter role geography had become concerned with the efficient organization of the newly emerging corporate state. The 'social good' and the 'national interest' were intimately bound together in the optimism and faith of postwar Europe, and such technological and bureaucratic capacities of state organization were built up in the name of distributive justice (Harvey, 1974, 20-21). However, such a socially engaged geography soon clashed with the fourth imperative: the sense of moral obligation. One outcome of this sense of moral obligation was the further extension of earlier humanist traditions in which increasing emphasis was placed on the individual and his immediate world of experience. Initially the positivist understanding of method and application resulted in a geography (including a humanistic geography) in which 'fact' and 'value' were seen to be distinct from each other. Facts were the domain of science. Values were the realm

of extra-scientific knowledge and opinion. When this notion was challenged the separation of facts and values was seen to be a false, or at best misleading, one, and was itself based on a specific ideology. As Harvey (1974, p 23) argued:

The debate over relevance in geography was not really about relevance (whoever heard of irrelevant human activity), but about whom our research was relevant to and how it was that research done in the name of science (which was supposed to be ideology-free) was having effects that appeared somewhat biased in favour of the status quo and in favour of the ruling class of the corporate state.

(ii) The geography of human survival

The question I raise is whether or not these findings permit an investigation and evaluation of the human condition, and ultimately the attainment of the social good. (Anon, 1963, p 64)

The collapse of the positivist separation of fact and value, and the recognition of the normative content and value of all theory, was a fundamental challenge to the espoused value-freedom of spatial modelling and its applications in planning. The question had to be raised: planning by whom, for whom, with what intentions? If scientific models incorporated assumptions about value, space, power, access, etc., and these were not made explicit, then such applications of models operated as hidden forms of advocacy. Because such advocacy is uncritical it operates in favour of the status quo. If science could be used to facilitate the creation of efficient consumer spaces it could also be used to improve the quality of life for social groups (Buttimer, 1969; 1972), children (Bunge, 1973b; Hart, 1978; Wood, 1973, 1977, 1978a, 1978b), the aged (Rowles, 1978), and the blind (Hill, 1981, 1982). If scientific models were in practice normative, and their applications favoured particular groups, then why should science not also react to their dehumanizing consequences? why should science not be truly and explicitly normative by taking an emotional and moral commitment to certain values, by engaging in advocacy planning publically? why should science not begin with the needs of man, of the species, or of the children? Several seminal works appeared in the early 1970s where this position was taken, notably among them Buttimer (1974), Ley (1974) and Bunge (1971).

While it can be argued that some of these works were much more influential in the growing area of radical geography, they were not without effect in humanistic geography. In particular Anne Buttimer's *Values in geography* was very influential in raising geographers' awareness of their own role in the research process, while Jackson and Smith (1984) have shown how Ley's approach and methodology were significant stimuli to research which rejected the norms of predictive, hypothetico-deductive science. The publication of *Fitzgerald* (Bunge, 1971) also brought about an exchange of views about the role and extent of commitment in geographical inquiry and its relationship to methodology (Lewis, 1973; Ley, 1973; Bunge, 1974). In *Fitzgerald* Bunge argued that systematic geography failed to provide any real understanding of people and places; instead, it severed human experience through 'spatially disjointed biopsies'. Regional geographers must deal with the region as home, with the neighborhood as neighbor, and subjects as 'real people'. Only in this way can the science of geography be strengthened.

Science has not yet grasped how to deal with the individual, his sense of purpose, and the social effects of his actions. One possibility for Bunge was the 'personality sketch', where a particular social event swirls around an individual. Thus *Fitzgerald* is more than an academic study; it is also a biographical account, first of Bunge's own 'crusade', and second of the community of Fitzgerald (Ley, 1973, p 133). "In the final analysis, Bunge is concerned less with writing social scientific theory than with airing a number of moral and ethical questions. It is a study by a humane as well as a human geographer" (Ley, 1973, p 135). While Bunge's methodology and interpretations were criticized by both Ley (1973) and Lewis (1973), *Fitzgerald* does symbolize the promise of an approach.

For geography, *Fitzgerald* might well accelerate a methodological revolution already begun, a shift towards a more behavioral and microregional focus, and a shift also towards advocate intervention in social and spatial processes - an involvement which participant observers have traditionally fought shy of.

(Ley, 1973, p 135)

Bunge's work exemplifies three key concerns of a developing humanistic geography: (i) the focus on home, neighbourhood, place, and human relationships in the formation and maintenance of a community; (ii) the possibility of alternative methods, which up to this point had been denied by the 'new geography' - the integral use of illustrations, the historical evolution of community, personal biographies, interviews, and participant observation; and (iii) an explicit treatment of the value context of inquiry. Bunge thus offers an illustration of what a geography from the inside" might look like.

In Bunge's (1973a) essay 'The geography of human survival' a fourth concern of humanistic geography is dealt with. This is the notion of critique, necessary to establish the solid ground for mankind against the insidious encroachment of 'machinekind'. Contrasting mankind and machinekind he focusses upon the process of dehumanization confronting man today in which process geography is an active participant: a geography of "infernal contraptions" awaits a species that fails to fully "humanize [itself] in order to totally humanize the machines" (Bunge, 1973a, p 277). The western distinction between man and nature must be broken down, and disciplines such as geography must become fully engaged in actively constructing the earth's surface into the permanent home of man (p 291). Geography must begin with the children, not with the machines (p 295). To this end 'mathematical' and 'spatial' geographies must not be rejected. To criticisms of mathematical geography, and in particular to the question whether "these findings permit an investigation and evaluation of the human condition and ultimately the attainment of the social good" (Anon, 1963), Bunge responded with a spirited defence of the humanism underlying and implicit in the works of many 'mathematical' geographers. The concern for mapping spatial relationships and for social intervention is a concern to create a better world, to construct "happy regions" (Bunge, 1973b, 331-334). The critique of spatial analysis and of the claim to relevance developed by the humanist geographers presents us with a half-truth. 'Mathematical' geographers in the struggle for humanism had developed locational models which permitted greater equality of access to social facilities ('tot lots', health care centres, etc.), information on access to legal and health services, and had yielded the possibility of better 'community control'. The Detroit Geographical Expedition had actually placed such analytic tools in the hands of black workers, from which local plans emerged.

As we will now see, humanistic geography took up the criticism of this form of rationality and the possibility it offered for alternative methodologies.

V THE SEARCH FOR AN EPISTEMOLOGY

(i) The two cultures

Throughout its history geography has experienced internal tensions in accounting for its methods and philosophy. Perhaps because of its broad, often inter-, trans-, or multi-disciplinary and synthetic role, the question of how the geographer deals with man-world, man-land, and man-space relationships has never really been settled for more than a few years at a time. Even the basic orientation of geography – as a science, as an art, as one of the humanities – has not been generally settled for long. Histories of the discipline perpetuate these basic uncertainties as they cast back to the contrasts between such figures as von Humboldt (the consummate artist, responsive to impressions of regional landscapes and local variations in place) and Ritter (the systematizer and cataloguer of phenomena parodied in Saint-Exupéry's (1943) *The little prince*).

Indeed, geographers have long been familiar with this manner of distinguishing approaches since it is essentially the distinction between nomothetic (the general, law-seeking approach) and the idiographic (the concern with the individual and the particular) with which Hartshorne dealt extensively (Hartshorne 1939; 1959).

The publication in the late 1950s and early 1960s of Bronowski's *Science and human values*, SNOW'S *The two cultures*, and HUXLEY'S *Literature and science* (Bronowski, 1965; Snow, 1959; Huxley, 1963) initiated further discussions across all disciplines about the nature of inquiry and method. For Snow, science meant the empirical sciences, while for Huxley it meant the natural sciences. The two cultures of Snow's book are to be distinguished by the specific experiences with which they deal. The scientist is the inhabitant of a radically different universe – not the universe of given appearances, but the world of inferred fine structures, not the experienced world of unique events and diverse qualities, but the world of quantified regularities" (Huxley, 1963, p 8). While science deals with intersubjectively accessible experiences, literature deals mainly with private experiences. The first can be expressed in formalized languages such as mathematics and logic, while the latter must gain the assent of the reader about essentially unrepeatable experiences through the evocative description of concrete cases in everyday language.

In geography this takes the form of two broad dimensions. Firstly, the systematic search for the differences between one place and another (Kant, Hettner, Hartshorne), and later the search for laws and regularities in nature and human behaviour (Ritter, Schaefer). Secondly, participation in the cultural heritage through the humanities. In the first instance we encounter an empirical concern for creating new knowledge by formalizing relationships between previously disparate phenomena. In the second instance we find a pedagogic concern with clarifying what is already there, influencing our daily life, that is, the culture or the tradition in which sit the world we create and the meanings we forge. It is this second

approach, dealing with culture, landscapes, people, and places, that has regarded itself as humanist in orientation (see Jordan and Rowntree, 1974, p 4). By and large the methods of this second approach are loosely based upon those of the humanities generally: textual exegesis for the recovery of the past views of the world (Van Paassen, Glacken), the interpretation of imaginary and perceived worlds (Lowenthal, Prince), the evaluation of attitudes towards and images of particular places (Ralph Brown, Wright, Guelke), and the examination of artifact and pattern to recover past (sometimes relict, sometimes antecedent) cultures. Meinig (1983, p 315) suggests that 'humanistic geography' can be distinguished from the earlier human geography by a "self-conscious drive to connect with that special body of knowledge, reflection, and substance about human experience and human expression, about what it means to be a human being on this earth".

(ii) Geography as art

The third approach takes geography to be one of the humanities and specifically as art. This claim to geography as art is both a claim about method and about approach, as well as a claim about what constitutes evidence for research. Since literature, art, and history are seen to deal with private experiences, they not surprisingly become the window on to such experiences:

The world with which literature deals is the world in which human beings are born and live and finally die; the world in which they love and hate, in which they experience triumph and humiliation, hope and despair; the world of sufferings and enjoyments, of madness and commonsense, of silliness, cunning and wisdom; the world of social pressures and individual impulses, of reason against passion, or instincts and conventions, of shared language and unsharable feelings and sensations.... (Huxley, 1963, p 8)

Turning to artistic works renders evidence which may be available in no other way: the painting, the poem, and the novel become source material from which the geographer can gain valuable 'data' pertaining to individual and social perceptions of places and landscapes (Rees, 1976a, 1976b; Lowenthal and Prince, 1964, 1965; Salter and Lloyd, 1977). Even Tuan, for whom geography is only narrowly rooted in the humanities (1978, p 195), sees the geographer as "intellectual middleman" between art and science, the one who decomposes artistic experience into themes that can be systematically treated and scientifically investigated (1976, p 274). While this is perhaps not a very penetrating claim to geography as art, it has been greatly emphasized (Tuan, 1976b, 1978; Seamon, 1976; Buttner and Seamon, 1980; Pocock, 1981).

A more profound argument for geography as art is that geographic practice itself is an art. Most recently it is an argument made by Donald Meinig (1971, 1983) and John Fraser Hart (1982), but it is, Meinig argues, "an old and common assertion with precious little substantiation" (Meinig, 1983, p 314). Sauer (1925) had argued for the geographer to take the personality of a region into account, while Wreford Watson (1982) has developed this notion in his regional descriptions. Such description is, for Hart (1982) the highest form of the geographer's art", and for David Harvey (1974, p 22), though there is much to be ashamed of, at its best geographic thinking "produces an acute sensitivity to place and community, to the symbiotic relations between individuals, communities and environments".

(The often ignored correlate to this claim should in fairness be added: This sensitivity to locale and interaction produces a kind of parochial humanism - a humanism that is, in certain senses deep and penetrating, but which is locked into the absolute spaces generated by the regional concept.")

In this view geography appears to be more a craft than a science, and perhaps for this reason geographers subscribing to this view have devoted little attention to the detailed methods of "geography as art" (Ley and Samuels, 1978, p 9). Lewis (1979) has formalized axioms for reading the landscape, Sauer (1956) argued for the importance of fieldwork, and Meinig (1971) has spoken of environmental appreciation as a humane art and regional writing as a vital part of that art. Glassie (1975) has argued for the strengths of a structuralist approach to material culture, while more recently Duncan (1978) has focused attention on interactionism as a viable theoretical perspective for the study of culture. But these works are few in number. Generally the "geography as art" tradition has produced few works of a strictly methodological nature. Thus far geographers have not routinely seeded that ground and cultivated and fertilized it, weeding out the worst and nurturing the best, experimenting with new forms, alert for new varieties, all with a conviction that the harvest will yield more than a bit of spice of flavoring, it will provide some of the staples for a healthy geography" (Meinig, 1983, p 315).

There is good reason for this seeming willingness to allow talent to flourish in a nurturing environment, without the strict methodological guidelines that typify other forms of geographic research. Perhaps more than any other approach to geography the history of geography as art is a history of charismatic personalities - the creative individual - Sauer, Kniffen, Lewis, Meinig, Glassie, etc. But beyond this the experience of place and of landscape is assumed to be: (i) a geographical experience, and (ii) an existential category of man's being. The description of geographical experience is an inherently significant activity because geographical experience is basic to the good life. "We shall not have a humanistic geography worthy of the claim until we have some of our most talented and sensitive scholars deeply engaged in the creation of the literature of the humanities. Geography will deserve to be called an art only when a substantial number of geographers become artists" (Meinig, 1983, p 325). Certainly geographers have, of late, devoted much of their attention to the interrogation of the views of artists, authors, and poets to places and landscapes, in attempts to broaden their own sensitivity to the meaning of place (Cosgrove, 1978).

(iii) The phenomenological foundations of geographical experience

Earlier, it was argued that humanistic geography continues to bear the burden of particular interpretations of empiricism and humanism. This is nowhere more evident than in the claims that the subject matter of geographical inquiry is geographical experience: a pre-theoretical relationship of man to place and landscape. Geographers may not have a common perspective or methodology (as the angry debates of the 1960s had shown) but they did have a sound and common phenomenological base in experience to which formal geography must respond.

The phenomenological basis of geography takes several forms in the literature: 'phenomenological foundations' (Relph, 1976b); 'immediate experience of life' (Relph, 1976b, p 1); 'geographical consciousness'

(Van Paassen, 1957); 'geographical experience' (Dardel, 1952); 'everyman as geographer and practical geographies' (Lowenthal, 1961); 'life world' (Buttimer, 1976). Interest in these domains is prompted by what Gregory (1978a, p 123) refers to as geography's "traditional attachment to particular places and the people that live in them". Such claims have a long and respectable tradition within the discipline: Sauer's seeing the land with the eyes of its own inhabitants; Wright's geosophy; Whittlesey's 'sense of terrestrial space'; Lowenthal's (1961, p 260) man as "artist and landscape architect, creating order and organizing space, time and causality in accordance with our apperceptions and predilections". Each in some way seeks to recover the 'spirit' or 'character' of a place (Gregory, 1978a, p 137). Each assumes this phenomenological basis to geographical understanding.

Not surprisingly, from what has been said, this phenomenological basis is not constituted by geographic research, but is uncovered and retrieved by it. The objects of geographic inquiry - sense of place and landscape - are not formalizations of a disciplinary perspective, but are root experiences which derive from a pre-scientific 'geographical consciousness'; a geographical knowledge which "lie[s] in the direct experiences and consciousness we have of the world we live in" (Relph, 1976a, p 4). Thus "geographers and geography exist only in a society with a geographical sense" (Van Paassen, 1957, p 21). For Lowenthal (1961, p 242) "anyone who inspects the world around him is in some measure a geographer". Consequently, formal geography becomes a mirror for this basic human experience (Relph, 1976a, p 4). Furthermore, it is concerned with phenomena, that cannot be merely observed, but which "must be lived to be grasped as they really are.... Such phenomena of experience are the substance of our involvements in the world and constitute the foundations of the formal body of knowledge we term 'Geography'" (Relph, 1976b, p 1).

It should be clear from this brief review that the task of humanistic geography (and one of its main methods - phenomenology) has been to investigate the hidden layers of human behaviour to reveal everyday geographical experience; it is to be an archaeology. Like archaeology, its principal task is retrieval. According to this view, abstraction and reduction are not only redundant but actually hide or distort experience. Science (an inherently abstractive and reductive enterprise, whether as hypothetico-deductive or as hermeneutic or interpretative) is thus easily dismissed (Mercer and Powell, 1972; Buttimer, 1976, Smith, 1979). (But see Pickles, 1985, s16f on some of the ways in which geographers have misinterpreted the relationship between phenomenology and science.) Here the geographer's task is to describe and evoke. It requires skills of expression, representation, and careful description. It is to be linked to those other forms of human expression which touch experience in its immediacy - art, literature, and history. It is to be art, and it is to work with and through the humanities.

(iv) Geography as interpretative science

It is a very short step from recognizing that the study of the human condition must also be a study of human values, and of responses of people to their homes, neighbourhoods, and regions, to the recognition that epistemologically and methodologically this requires interpretation. Geography as art and as one of the humanities is implicitly interpretative. Yet unlike the arts and humanities from which it draws, surprisingly little consideration

has yet been given to the problems of textual exegesis and interpretation (hermeneutics) in geography. If we can accept that cultural geographers are correct in claiming that landscapes can be read as a book, or that humanists are correct in arguing in favour of using printed and painted 'texts' as sources for their insights about particular places, then the canons and methods of interpretation that guarantee the reasonableness of any single interpretation and the validity of any particular form of text must be clarified (Boeckh, 1968; Palmer, 1969; Hirsch, 1976).

One has to turn to those concerned with geography as a human science to find this issue discussed. Rose (1980, 1981) has introduced Dilthey's hermeneutics of text interpretation to geographers, while Gregory (1978a & b) and Ley (1981a, 1982) have perhaps given the broadest justification for interpretative science thus far. The theoretical foundation for a hermeneutic approach in geography has not yet been developed. The reader can fully expect to see more work in this vein in coming years, if only because the 'qualitative methodologies' to which humanists have turned require such a rigorous theoretical underpinning if they are not to be the merely 'soft-headed' approaches that critics have argued they are.

VI THE QUESTION OF METHOD

While the emergence of geography's new humanism' was spearheaded by a diligent search for appropriate philosophical alternatives to positivism, the discussion of method has been neglected (Jackson, 1984). The question of method, as we have seen, does not arise for a position which sees geographical knowledge as native to everyman, and good geography as art. Part of the notion underlying the distinction between geography as science and geography as one of the arts or one of the humanities is the assumption that science provides certain knowledge while the arts and humanities deal only with opinion.

The debate between positivist and post-positivist researchers (including humanists) was thus not only one between different subject matter and values. It was also a debate about knowledge and method. The positivist notion of science holds a conception of knowledge which accepts only those things which are absolutely certain as scientifically rigorous. Descartes's radical doubt and strict procedures for overcoming the "deception of the senses" remain, for positivists, the necessary beginning for methods which provide certain knowledge. Scientifically approved statements are those which pass the tests of certainty. These methods rely on deductive logical and intersubjectively verifiable data. Post-positivist understanding of science challenges this understanding of knowledge. In particular it argues that positivism's methodological restrictions are too narrow and do not address the most significant questions about the human realm.

(i) Humanism as hand-maiden to 'scientific geography'

The fully radical nature of the claim has not, however, informed all claims about humanism in regard to knowledge and method. Entrikin (1976, p 616), for example, exemplifies the initially tentative, and still positivistically bounded interpretation of humanist approaches, when he argues that humanistic geography is not a viable alternative to scientific (i.e., positivistic) geography, but is best understood as a form of criticism which helps "to

counter the overly objective and abstractive tendencies of some scientific geographers". Positivist science and phenomenology are concatenated in this manner, and the power of post-positivist methodologies is diffused. Meinig (1983, 315-316) has even gone so far as to argue that:

Almost all of this avowedly humanistic geography is analytical in intent, aimed at a systematic examination of subjective meaning and human behaviour. Most of it seems little more than an extension of science. ...to an important degree 'humanism' as a philosophy or ideology has often become narrowed to a form of scientism, it has become manipulative and proscriptive, a rationalism pushed to its limits.

From the beginnings of modern science this methodological debate has taken place within the framework of a distinction between *doxa* (opinion or belief) and *episteme* (certainty and knowledge). *Doxa* (or what we believe to be true) and *episteme* (or what we know to be true) are juxtaposed. In the former, certainty is not assured and we may be mistaken by the deception of the senses". By contrast *episteme* provides firm ground 'upon' (epi) which we can 'stand' (*[h]istanai*). Thus epistemology (the *logos* or the study of *episteme*) is the search for methods and foundations which enable us to be assured of the truth of our knowledge. Such methodologically founded inter-subjective and certain knowledge is scientific. Two principal exemplars provide methodological certainty: mathematical axioms (rationalism) and sense experience (empiricism), and in logical positivism or logical empiricism this concern for sense experience is combined with the notion that statements must be connected by logical necessity.

In this way positivists have reduced the world of ordinary experience and awareness to 'mere' opinion: a chimera of deception and uncertainty. In our everyday world we hold beliefs and opinions about things, other people, and ourselves through interpretative frameworks that are passed on from our cultural, personal, and environmental interactions. Michael Polanyi (1962) has called this form of knowledge 'personal knowledge', and it is ordinarily not questioned unless some problem arises with it. However, because it is not normally questioned this does not mean that it is necessarily mere opinion without foundation in the actual state of affairs. Indeed Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Peter Winch's interpretation of it for social science, Martin Heidegger's ontology, Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, and Habermas's critical theory all argue that any claims to absolute certainty are misleading since human beings are always and necessarily embedded within their language systems and their cultures. All knowledge is conditional, constructed within one or other conceptual system. But such conditional knowing cannot be interpreted as 'mere opinion' or as relativistic. Such knowing is the way we know anything. It is not a retreat from certainty to uncertainty and relativism. Claims can still be judged against each other in terms of the available evidence about the state of affairs.

Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher, had earlier argued against the Cartesian notion of method in *The new science*. We can gain knowledge of human phenomena, not by rejecting our everyday understanding in favour of 'objective' methods, but by embracing such knowledge. We can understand history, he said, because we have made it ourselves.

The whole world of culture has, for certain, been produced by the physical and mental activity of man, and for this reason one can, and, in fact, has to, find its principles and regularities within the modes of existence of the spirit of the self-same people.

The new science was to be a study of the forms of social life developed by and created through human meaning. While Vico's work has only recently begun to inform geographers' work directly (Mills, 1982; Kunze, 1983a, 1983b) his emphasis on our ability to understand the 'made' and the 'lived' because we have made and lived is paralleled by the concern of humanists with meaning and lived experience. Out of this concern arises a rethinking of possible methodologies for inquiry: phenomenology, idealism, ethnomethodology, participant observation techniques, and ethnographic approaches. Humanism is here no longer the hand-maiden to positivistic science, nor merely a critique of its assumptions (although it also remains that). Within each of these methodological and philosophical positions humanism becomes a search for alternative forms of inquiry and methods for achieving rigorous knowledge about the human world. [An important distinction between rigorous and exact knowledge has yet to be accepted within the geographical literature, and may become a major contribution of phenomenology to the discipline. Natural science is exact because it is mathematical. Since it treats nature as a mathematical manifold such exactitude is rigorous. In the social and human realm, however, rigour is achieved only when phenomena are described accurately as they show themselves, i.e., as social and human. The extent to which, in this realm, rigorous knowledge must then have the character of inexactitude has still to be fully clarified. For an initial consideration of this issue see Pickles (1985a).]

(ii) The strong claims for humanistic geography

By the early 1970s the power of the abstract spatial models of the 'New' geography had been challenged by several thoughtful critiques, each of which further sought to incorporate aspects of what Kirk (1951) had called the behavioural environment in models dealing with the phenomenal environment. In humanistic geography we see the extension of these criticisms of deterministic modelling procedures, with the turn to the existential character of man's being - as a free, meaning-bound subject: what Tuan (1971, p 182) has characterized as 'environmentalism' (dealing with a world of objects) and 'existentialism' (dealing with a world of purposeful beings). Such a world is not necessarily a transparent, rational world, but is typified by the hesitations and indecisiveness that plague human beings who must decide and act in the complexity and shifting demands of the real world" (Tuan, 1973, p 411). It is a world of ambivalence and ambiguity.

Here geography no longer seeks to understand the human world solely in terms of artifacts (such as houses, barns, and farm layouts) nor in terms of the abstract concepts (such as space, culture, nation-state), but in terms of the behaviour, feelings, ideas, sentiments, hopes, faith, and despairs of those involved. 'World', 'meaning', and 'place' become important concepts as geographers pay more attention to the role of human awareness in geographical behaviour. Humanistic geography is thus the study of articulated geographical ideas; of geographical knowledge (Tuan, 1976a, 267-8; also Wright, 1947). Such knowledge deals with home and territoriality, notions and experiences of place, as well as knowledge about and use of space. Here territory is not abstract space, but a network of paths and places. Any

understanding of the human world must account for how these networks of paths and places come into being - it must be historical (Tuan, 1976, p 272), and it must be experiential (Tuan, 1975, 1977). Synthetic description of human experience in places is the aim of humanistic geography, the vivid depiction of a region is its highest achievement (Hart, 1982; Meinig, 1983). The "humanist's competence lies in interpreting human experience in its ambiguity, ambivalence, and complexity. His main function as a geographer is to clarify the meaning of concepts, symbols, and aspirations as they pertain to space and place" (Tuan, 1976, p 275a). In this way humanistic geography is reflective and critical. It takes as its starting point man as an acting, free agent: a knowing subject, a moral being (Tuan, 1972, p 326). The landscape here is not merely the product of a set of deterministic and probabilistic laws, but is like an old letter - it tells us something about the people who 'wrote' it (Tuan, 1971, p 183). We cannot relive the experiences of other people in the past as they create their landscapes and places (Tuan, 1972, p 326; but see Guelke, 1974, 1982), but we can attempt to understand them.

Implicit in these claims is the distinction between the methods of the physical and human sciences: between *Erklären* (explanation) and *verstehen* (understanding). This dichotomy was first introduced by the German historian Johann Gustav Droysen in 1858. The physical sciences seek to explain phenomena by searching for necessary and predictive laws. The human sciences seek an understanding of human experience. The methodological differences between the two result from the differences between two kinds of knowledge. Kant had earlier elaborated a similar distinction between theoretical knowledge (concerned with appearances and the realm of nature) and practical reason (concerned with moral decisions). While Kant himself did not accept the distinction between physical and human sciences, and while positivists continued to reject such knowledge as speculative and lacking in certainty, neo-Kantian scholars recognized the need for 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) in dealing with cultural phenomena.

Much of this early debate in German science and philosophy has found its way into geographical reflections only quite recently, in part because of the hegemony of Hartshorne's restricted interpretation of relevant German thought in *The nature of geography* (see Gould, 1979, p 141). However, one aspect has already been noted. The southwest German (or Baden) school, with Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert as its leaders, have indirectly influenced geographic thought. The distinction between nomothetic (*nomos* = law) and idiographic (*idio* = personal, particular) was introduced into this general debate by Windelband. The physical sciences sought to 'explain' phenomena by tying them to law-like relationships through the construction of causal relationships. Historical inquiry, by contrast, deals with the individual, unique event, and does not seek to explain but to understand its meaning and circumstances. Although Windelband argued that any particular event could be studied by either method of inquiry, geographers have come to associate the two approaches with distinct areas of subject-matter. They have sought to build a distinct set of methodologies on the basis of this idiographic approach founded on a radical individualism. However, findings in disciplines such as linguistics, philosophy and psychology have shown quite convincingly that events only make sense within some broader framework; that perception cannot take place without concepts. In other words, geographers have adopted a misleading notion of the unique, and its relation with the general in their attempts to erect a convenient methodological distinction.

(iii) Idealist epistemology

Many of the geographic studies which investigate environmental perception and experience are implicitly idealist in orientation. As we have seen they accord primacy to mental activity and to ideas, only through which, they argue, can the world be known. Guelke has become the most out-spoken supporter of an idealist geography: The philosophy of idealism recognizes mind as the foundation of human existence and knowledge.... This principle finds expression in the idea that history can be conceived as a process of thought" (Guelke, 1982, p 2). The idealist geographer "does not neglect the material conditions of human existence, but insists that such conditions acquire their significance and meaning in terms of human desires and ideas" (Guelke, 1982, p 138). His task is to understand the actions of the past by reenacting or rethinking in his own mind the thought that gives rise to the actions (Guelke, 1982, p 2). Understanding, as a mode of knowing in historical geography, is thus to be contrasted with explanation as the mode of knowing in natural science: "History is by definition limited to the mind, and the mind cannot comprehend the real world directly.... History is no longer concerned with explanation... but with understanding events and actions in terms of the thought expressed in them" (Guelke, 1982, p 2). Historical understanding is the reenactment of thought. But this form of understanding is not empathetic in an emotional sense. While idealist history seeks to see the world from the point of view of different cultures, as Wright (1947) had argued earlier, this seeing must conform to rules of inference and evidence. Following Collingwood, who argued that all history is the history of thought, Guelke seeks to argue that geography's concern is with all manner of ideas and knowledge in so far as these were the ideas of the people involved (Guelke, 1982, 2-3).

(iv) Epistemologies of experience

While Guelke still retains certain ambiguities in his claims for a history of understanding predicated on rules of inference and evidence adapted from the scientific tradition he criticizes, we find in geographical phenomenology and ethnomethodology a more radical attempt to shift away from empiricism and positivism towards more 'humane' methodologies. The phenomenological perspective was introduced into geography in the works of Relph (1970), Tuan (1971, 1976a), Mercer and Powell (1972), Buttner (1976), and Entrikin (1976). It is exemplified in different ways in Gregory (1978a), Seamon (1979a), Ley (1981a), Relph (1981) and Pickles (1985a). Despite substantial differences in interpretation and approach, and despite great variations in the extent to which each draws upon the phenomenological literature as such, all share the common recognition that knowledge is grounded in immediate and taken-for-granted experience; what Seamon (1979a, p 15) refers to as man's "inescapable immersion in the geographical world". Knowledge is not the arbiter of such experience, but the product of it. The lifeworld is the origin of meaning for an individual and group, not an aggregate notion of individual perceptual responses. Everyday experience is not monadical in a Leibnizian sense (i.e., a closed box of consciousness divorced from the outside world), but is from the beginning a social experience of the world, self and others. From childhood the lifeworld provides the structured context of meanings within which learning and socialization occurs. As adults we live within such a network of meanings, often taking them for granted (Ley, 1981a). We necessarily presuppose this foundational lifeworld, in terms of which our actions are meaningful or not, useful or not. Thus any

attempt to focus upon it and to retrieve it must be a form of reflexive explanation (Gregory, 1978a). Phenomenology seeks to provide the method for this reflective enterprise (Pickles, 1985a).

Roger Hart (1978) has shown how the world of childhood extends its spatial understanding through spatial play in a social context. Similarly Denis Wood (1973, 1977, 1978a, 1978b) has been working on the development of a cartography of experience, seeking to develop mapping techniques which capture the world of immediate experiences of space, time, distance, difficulty, etc. Rowles (1978, p xvii) summarizes the attempt to unify a variety of methodological approaches to capture something of the richness of this world of experience:

My research is located squarely within a man/land tradition of geographical inquiry.... In recent decades growing interest in the study of environmental cognition has added a new dimension to the man/land theme. In the emergence of this "perception" school within geography, the individual's cognition of the environment was at first viewed simply as a distorting perceptual filter mediating the man/environment relationship. More recently an increasing sophistication has resulted in the acknowledgment of the symbolic and emotional meanings of places as integral features of the total person/environment relationship. This more refined interpretation has been facilitated by growing appreciation of humanistically oriented approaches to inquiry. Moreover, in the quest for deeper insight, geographers are beginning to consider smaller groups and even individuals in their studies.

More broadly, Rowles epitomizes the humanist's concern for geographical experience, interpreted as the individual's involvement with the spaces and places of his or her life. Biography has become a commonly used vehicle for capturing such experience. Thus Rowles (1978, p xix) begins: "I'd like to start by telling you about my friend Stanislaw Linsky".

The task of the humanistic geographer is thus both the evaluation of the personal involvements of a particular group and the evocative re-creation and description of those involvements. Ethnographic methodologies, which seek to reconstruct the environmental or place experiences of certain groups and individuals have become common. Interviews, participant observation techniques, and other recording devices seek to provide structured methods by which the geographer can enter the world of others. David Seamon (1979a; 1979b; 1980) has tried to extend these methodologies by incorporating elements of descriptive phenomenology into his research. Methodologically he calls for a broader conception of what constitutes valid evidence, and a willingness to be "open to the phenomena themselves".

Misconceptions as to the nature of and claims for phenomenology abound in the geographic literature. This is not the place to attempt to unravel them however. The interested reader is directed to my *Phenomenology, science and geography* (Pickles, 1985a).. Anyone seeking to develop a phenomenological, interpretative or hermeneutic approach to geographical topics should be aware of the errors in the project as passed on to geographers. The errors remain even in the most recent literature. Jackson (1981) has argued that phenomenology is individualistic and subjectivist, and Jackson and Smith (1984, p 27) still argue incorrectly that as a method, phenomenology is

utterly opposed to the extension of rational scientific analysis to the study of human beings". This is not the case. Phenomenologists do oppose positivism as an approach to scientific inquiry on the grounds that it is overly reductionistic, is limited to a too narrow conception of evidence, and arbitrarily accepts only a limited range of methods of inquiry. But they do not oppose science as such. Indeed Husserl - the father of modern phenomenology - had as his primary aim the development of a method (phenomenology) that would provide a rational foundation for the increasingly irrational empirical sciences.

The lifeworld of taken-for-granted meanings and its foundation in experience is the beginning point for scientific inquiry. On its shoulders science has erected an edifice of constructs, concepts, and models. Over time such science has lost touch with its roots in everyday experience. Indeed positivism, as we have seen, has argued that scientific knowledge and explanation holds priority over experience, understanding and what Descartes referred to as the "deception of the senses". In this view human experience is reduced to individual perception, and this can easily be shown scientifically to be variable and uncertain. Instead objective concepts are needed, which are not affected by individual subjectivity. These are scientific concepts.

A clear geographic example of this shift in attitudes from experience to scientific explanation is the notion of space. It is no coincidence that humanistic geographers have focused their attention on place and the experience of place. Under positivism geographers sought objective, predictive knowledge. Generally speaking the formal space of geometry provided a firm foundation for such knowledge. While non-Euclidean geometries and more recently algebraic and topological spaces have been used by geographers, with Kant most geographers have presumed Euclidean space to be the real space (see Sack, 1980). Measured against Euclidean space human spatiality is seen to be a distortion - it is subjective, idiosyncratic, unreliable. Only by aggregating spatial responses can such unreliability be evened out.

It is the strength of the phenomenological position from the 1970s onwards that it has sought systematically to reverse this understanding, and to show how it is a distortion of the state of affairs. In particular the above view confuses reliable knowledge with valid knowledge. The formal geometries, such as Euclidean geometry, are not objective measures against which subjective understanding is to be evaluated. Instead we must turn this argument around to re-establish its correct relationship. Formal geometry is an abstraction from and formalization of the experiential base of all science - the experience of the lifeworld. Contrary to all accounts thus far in geography the concern for the subjectivity of the individual is not a product of humanism, but of an understanding of scientific knowledge which divorces itself from this experiential base. In so doing, from Descartes on, science has opposed to its own rigour and exactitude the deception and looseness of subjective understanding. Positivism has created this myth of subjectivity, not humanism.

However, it must also be said that in rejecting objectivism in science and in seeking to return to a human world of meaning and understanding, humanists have themselves focused upon subjectivity and consciousness in order to show the ways in which such domains are vital and cannot be ignored. Derek Gregory (1978a) and David Ley (1981b, 1983) have directed our attention

toward the need to mediate between objectivism and subjectivism, while hermeneutic approaches precisely seek to provide a philosophical and methodological means for transcending such dualisms. It is to these claims that we now turn.

(v) Hermeneutics and poetics

The rejection of the subjectivism and voluntarism of idealism and humanistic psychology has led some to seek a reappraisal of the one-sidedness of humanistic claims. David Harvey (1972; 1974) and Neil Smith (1979) have pointed to these flaws in humanistic thinking. The attempt to resolve the situation from within is seen most clearly in David Ley's concern with the relationship between subjective meaning in human action and the objective structures of social reproduction (Gregory, 1981, 1982; Ley, 1982; Jackson and Smith, S., 1984). In this agency-structure debate, the work of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz (Ley) on the one hand and Jurgen Habermas on the other hand (Gregory) have become increasingly central. Humanistic geographers have become less concerned with personal meaning patterns, and in the move away from individualism have become more concerned with the way in which power and social relations are concealed by skeins of intersubjectively woven social meanings (Gregory, 1978b; Ley, personal communication).

The attempt to mediate between subjectivism and objectivism has important methodological implications. The opening of the above issue to debate within geography has encouraged several geographers to explore alternative philosophies and methodologies in an attempt to ameliorate the perceived excesses of subjectivism within idealism, geographical interpretations of phenomenology, and humanistic psychology. Thus Smith (1981, S.J.) has turned to pragmatist philosophies, and Jackson (1981) has argued for a reconsideration of Durkheimian perspectives as an antidote to these claims.

Beyond these attempts, which increasingly are rooted in the regeneration of social geography (Jackson and Smith, 1984), is the interpretative tradition of hermeneutics and the growing interest in the poetic philosophy of Giambattista Vico.

Despite the radical transformation in geographic thought and practice that has occurred since 1970 we must still recognize that, as Heidegger and Habermas have both shown, we remain positivists. Nowhere is this clearer than in humanism's attempt to navigate new philosophical and methodological pathways using the maps provided by positivism itself. In particular the ready acceptance of the nomothetic-idiographic distinction, and the consequent concern to avoid or embrace subjectivism remains with us. Notions of epistemology, method and evidence still have to be thought through if human science is to give a rigorous, rational and humane account of itself. Two recent directions with these goals at their centres are philosophical hermeneutics and Vico's New Science.

Hermeneutics

The phenomenological reflections of Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer clarified for us the horizontal, rather than the absolute, nature of scientific claims. Only within an horizon or framework of meaning can we make valid claims as scientists. That is, the claims of every empirical science are meaningful

only within a prior framework of meaning - of concepts, terminology, objectifications, and formalizations. Within that framework, that which constitutes evidence, appropriate method, and valid claims are established.

More broadly the world is always and necessarily given within the limits of some perspective on it. The pen is a tool for writing only within a culture which has literature and written symbols. Subatomic particles have meaning only within a framework of energy, mass and motion. This is the meaning of the much misunderstood notion of hermeneutics. Correctly conceived, hermeneutics arises initially from a methodological concern with text interpretation. By extension it has come to characterize the way in which man relates to his world - always as an interpretative being, enmeshed in a framework of pre-given meaning relations.

The hermeneutic manner by which man understands the world applies to the lifeworld of everyday existence and to the objectified world of science (see Heelan, 1983). In this way modern theory in its search to explicate the horizon of meaning within which any particular world is given - whether as a world of human endeavour and freedom (humanism), as a world constrained by spatial forms (spatial analysis), as an ideologically bounded world of system constraints and power relations (radical approaches) - is an endeavour that attempts to clarify the nature of the world interpretatively.

Dilthey argues that there can be no "presuppositionless understanding". To be understood every thing and every idea must have a frame of reference, or a framework of meaning within which it is the thing that it is. While geographers have attempted to drive a wedge between Husserlian phenomenology and Dilthey's hermeneutics (for example, Jackson and Smith, 1984, p 37) it should be noted that both greatly admired the work of the other, finding in the other a kindred spirit in a hostile age. Furthermore, it is in the work of Martin Heidegger (the student of Husserl and the admirer of Dilthey) that hermeneutic phenomenology is most fully developed.

Poetics

Because geographers have a natural association with the physical sciences and are pragmatic rather than theoretical in their general outlook, the difficulties of understanding Vico are multiplied. It is as though the discipline, in dividing its interests between 'objectivity' as a model of scientific procedure and 'subjectivity' as a humanistic concern for questions of value and meaning, has totally missed Vico's argument for a viewpoint which subsumes both the subject and object in a theory of history and culture" (Kunze, 1983a, p 237). Thus geographers have been rather slow to recognize the recent resurgence of interest among philosophers and other social scientists in the work of Giambattista Vico.

Under the principle of *verum ipsum factum* (one may know that which one has made) Vico identifies human works with human truths (Kunze, 1983b, p 12). Unlike knowledge of the natural world, which can only be contingent, culture is at once accessible (because we have made it) and opaque (because of its manifold forms). Descartes erred when his 'radical doubt' led him to ground knowledge in the radical subjectivism of the cogito. True knowledge is not consciousness of the self, but of that which man has made - culture, language, art, and knowledge itself.

Here Vico's poetics intersects with philosophical hermeneutics. Both seek to overcome the idea that knowledge is a singular phenomenon. The theoretical knowledge of science is not the only, nor necessarily the true knowledge of the human condition and of society, as positivism claims. Such a humanism is not merely a recovery or rediscovery of human beings in their complexity, but an attempt to reestablish the claims of poetic and practical forms of knowledge to the truth; to replace poetic and practical wisdom alongside theoretical knowledge (Fisch and Bergin, in Vico, 1944, p 56; Gadamer, 1975). For the humanist only then will positivism be transcended, and a human(e) geography become possible.

VII CONCLUSIONS. THROUGH HUMANISM AND BEYOND?

Capitalism has given rise to a new culture...which has translated the predatory individualism of the American Adam into a therapeutic jargon that celebrates not so much individualism as solipsism, justifying self-absorption as 'authenticity' and 'awareness'. (Lasch, 1979, p 370)

Debate continues about the nature and role of humanism in modern geography. Under the powerful arguments from realist and materialist critiques humanism has perhaps lost some of its earlier force. Certainly humanists have become aware that some of their claims - while still important - may also be parochial, particularly in a world where life and death issues take on an immediacy which heretofore they may not have had. In the shadow of regional famine, nuclear threat, regional wars, ethnic conflict, massive refugee displacements, and the increasing power of statist and corporatist institutions, the concerns for cultural understanding (as 'cultivation') seems to be a concern of the privileged, certainly of the minority. Under the combined pressure for relevance and immediacy, culture must retreat.

The issue is fundamental to whether there remains a role for humanism, and indeed to what we mean by humanism. It is, however, beyond the scope of this work, and perhaps takes us beyond the bounds of geographic discourse. It raises questions of culture, scholarship, and education. It goes to the heart of our modern scientific society and its assumptions. It becomes philosophy. If schools and universities, and their disciplines, were ever the site for learning about the world - for the cultivation and socialization of the individual - under the dominance of scientific inquiry they no longer retain that function. They become, as Lasch and Barzun suggest, the site of scholarship, but not of learning and education: they contribute to the spread of intellectual torpor and political passivity" (Lasch, 1979, p 229):

The truth is that art and culture do not belong in a university. It cannot be a home for them, because culture proper and scholarship proper are diametrically opposed. (Barzun, 1984, p 99)

To this extent many of our debates over the nature of geographic scholarship and education cannot be resolved within the current organization of society. Part of the humanist argument is both an argument about scholarship and about culture. The task of the argument for culture is not to seek to broaden the role of geography as art; to create enlightened creative consumers of culture within geography, but to end the segregation of, geographical understanding and everyday life - and this may mean challenging the basic premises of our

society. This does not mean that geographers should be trained to write more interesting and artistically sound geographies (as Meinig, 1983, suggests) for 'popular' and 'academic' consumption. Something more fundamental is required. The restoration of 'geographicacy', the revival of the geographical dimension of human existence: the unification of world, environment and work.

The debate is currently couched in terms of the utilitarian function of science versus the aesthetic rationale for humanistic (as artistic) geography. One side insists that a discipline that is not practical and of immediate value is doomed. The other side holds that it is valuable precisely because it resists assimilation into the 'instrumental values' that are dominant in modern western society.

The issue needs, however, to be reformulated. To state it as a choice between utilitarian and aesthetic defences of geography acquiesces in the divorce of geographical knowledge from practical life. This formulation accepts as the premise of the debate the very conditions that have led to the crisis in the first place. The exaltation of art and culture has been closely linked to the degradation of labour and everyday practical life. Banished from the workplace and practical activity the knowledge geographers talk about has taken refuge in the rarified realm of school and university education. The issue is not how to make geography more useful but how to make useful activities geographical. This is not an issue that is likely to be settled in the schools. On the contrary, it will have to be settled in the workplace. Humanistic geographers should be the first to recognize and point out that our society has little use for geographical education which deals with home, place, art, and a form of knowledge which empowers people in the context of their everyday world and environment. Society has little use for education, as opposed to training, because it provides most people with jobs that are repetitious, mechanical, and mindless, in which they are prevented from using such knowledge. Any society gets the educational system and the forms of inquiry it deserves. If they really believe in the humanizing potential of geographical understanding, humanists must think about changing the system of production so as to provide people with work that demands geographical understanding, and that demands an education. As Lasch (1984, p 44) argues in relation to art:

The task is not to broaden the market for the fine arts, not to create larger numbers of enlightened consumers of culture, but to end the segregation of art and to achieve a new integration of art and everyday life.., even if this means challenging the basic premises of our society.

In so far as it cannot come to grips with these issues we begin to realize that there may be fundamental philosophical and methodological flaws in the structure of a modern humanism predicated on liberal individualism. Marxists, such as Harvey and Smith, have developed telling critiques of this position, while others, such as Gregory and Ley, have shown how interpretative inquiry must be situated within a broader context than subjectivity alone. Ley (1981a, 1983) has discussed some of the dangers of idealism in this regard, and Gregory (1978a) has shown convincingly the need for critical science to overcome the tendency towards parochial subjectivism. At their core these arguments reject the voluntarism and individualism of subjective humanism. The issue is currently at the forefront of geographic debate in

the form of discussions of structure and agency (Gregory, 1981, 1982; Ley, 1982; Jackson and Smith, 1984) and it must be addressed here if only by way of concluding and looking to the future.

(i) The possibility of a humanism

It is no use supposing that such an opposition between voluntarism and determinism can be overcome by simply bringing these rival types of approach together, conjoining one to the other. The problems involved are more deeply buried than that.

(Giddens, 1979, p 2)

The lines between humanism and radical approaches to geography have been drawn repeatedly over the past two decades, and have the character of clarification through delimitation. In the work of Eyles (1981) and Cosgrove (1983) in particular we find a willingness to attempt to think beyond the mere multiplicity of positions, to reject the relativistic pluralism that typifies works such as those by Harvey and Holly (1981) and Johnston (1983a, 1983b) and to provide some philosophical framework within which some unity is sought. Such unity is not, however, obtained at the expense of reducing one perspective to the other (see for example Unwin, 1984).

In this concluding chapter no such transcendent philosophical base can be laid out. Instead I will attempt to provide the strongest argument possible for the claims of humanism, even though these claims may go beyond those made explicit in the literature of humanism in geography. Through these arguments we may see how pedagogic and research activity contain within them some common aims.

The task of the modern university is to (i) convey, interpret and renew the cultural tradition, in part because to understand ourselves we must understand our being in its becoming - that is we must understand our historical nature; (ii) to provide students with the extra-professional skills and communicative competence necessary for citizenship; and (iii) to train them in the necessary skills for that life. This is the necessary basis for modern education, although the increasing dominance of technical training has been seen by some to threaten aspects of this threefold task. More specifically, as students are now preparing themselves for the next century, we can look at the task of the humanities within this framework as fourfold:

- a. They must be capable of mastering and evaluating a glut of information far beyond today's so-called 'knowledge explosion'.
- b. They must be able to defend their right to think for themselves in detecting and resisting mental manipulation and the ever more sophisticated means of propaganda, disinformation, and advertising". (Kidder, 1984, p 45).
- c. They will increasingly be called upon to identify for themselves standards of ethics and morality that will no longer be routinely provided for them by their major social structures". (Kidder, 1984, p 45).
- d. They will need to live, rather than just know, the truths they are defining - to come to grips with the ultimate spiritual goals and purposes of man, in order to cut through the relativism and nihilism of an increasingly technocentric age". (Kidder, 1984, p 45).

Clearly the "parochial humanism" that Harvey (1974) criticized will not be sufficient to fulfill this task, nor will a voluntaristic idealism and subjectivism which fails to distinguish adequately between knowledge and dis-information, knowledge and power, world and self, or to provide a sound ontological base on which ethical and moral issues can overcome relativism. The hidden presuppositions of our age, specifically those which have developed along with privatization of ownership, the division of labour in complex societies, and the unequal social division of resources and power, remain hidden under a mode of analysis which remains with the individual, the subjective and the immediate. These are critical issues yet to be faced. Whether they will be faced by the continual expansion of the 'philosophical net to incorporate, piecemeal, varied claims about pragmatism (Smith, 1984), Durkheimian perspectives (Jackson, 1981), or others, remains an open question. What is clear is that their solution requires philosophical thinking itself.

At its best humanism has refocused attention on questions of human dignity, on meaning, and on the quality of life. It has provided a telling critique of aspects of traditional theory of science (but has failed to be sufficiently radical in that critique, in particular it has failed to address the implications of implicit acceptance of a Cartesian epistemology). Humanism has defended the individual, and his claim to know, against the formalisms and structuralisms which reduce that claim to a chimera or a deception, and deny that man really knows or that he knows anything important. Above all humanism has opened discourse in geography in an un-doctrinaire (at times seemingly random) fashion, and has allowed the student of geography to invoke lost cultural traditions and thinking in the pursuit of the task of understanding the world as the home of man. This intellectual tolerance was in part a natural reaction to the doctrinaire claims of the 'New geography' of the 1960s. Its effect has been to expand the geographer's horizons to world, not just space, to intricate questions concerning the relationship between spatial form and social process, to questions of value and ethics. If humanism has been unpredictable, if it has been nostalgic and antiquarian, and if it has failed to establish sound claims to methodological rigour, it has functioned as the conscience of geography. It has not operated in the same way that radical approaches have pointed to clear and methodologically sound critiques of society under advanced capitalism. Instead it has adopted a reflective, at times uncertain manner of critique. Humanism has wandered in the landscapes of history, social thought, and reflection. At times it has become lost, it has become voluntaristic, and has failed to be sufficiently critical of its liberal assumptions. At times it has returned to empirical science and positivistic methods of fixity. But at times it has managed to break through its liberal and conservative ideology of reverence for the past, maintenance of the status quo, and divorce of theory, practice and action.

The value of humanism has been its resilience in constantly raising questions which do not fit within other frameworks. Certainly humanists have made several errors of judgement in recent years: their acceptance of and focus on the singularity of the individual; the monadic conception of consciousness; the relativism of perceptual approaches to behaviour; the adoption of *animate rationale* as the fundamental model of humanness; the voluntarizing of such class-based and ideologically distorted notions as community, placelessness, suburbs, visual blight; the perpetuation of atomistic conceptions of the individual and superorganic concepts of culture

and society; and the confusion of teleology with theory and methodology. These are crucial issues, and are perhaps sufficient for us to dismiss humanism as a failure, as Relph (1981) has done. And yet humanism has been the voice of man against reason, against science. It has been the voice of the artist against society, whether that voice has a place in geography is not a matter for legislation. "In these scientific times it is sometimes hard to remember that humanism is not a matter simply of attitude and substance, but of communication too" (Lowenthal and Bowden, 1976, p 5).

(ii) Humanism and Marxism

Several times already in this monograph it has been suggested that the interface between humanism and Marxism is a critical one in modern geography. This is not to claim that geography would necessarily benefit from uniting both perspectives. This might be an unlikely combination. However, we do now see the beginnings of attempts to look at modern geography through philosophically and methodologically integrated (Gregory, 1978, Eyles, 1981; Cosgrove, 1983) or pluralistic (Harvey and Holly, 1981; Johnston, 1983b) approaches. Any appropriation of social thought must be a critical appropriation if we are not to reinstitute the assumptions of the past in the future. The 'tradition' is suffused through and through with a metaphysics which assumes much more than we can now accept. It is the task of geography towards the twenty-first century to think beyond tradition to the liberation that knowledge of tradition can give. This judgement must include the texts of Marx as well as those of Sartre, remembering with Giddens that "there are no easy dividing lines to be drawn between Marxism and 'bourgeois social theory'. Whatever differences might exist between these, they share certain common deficiencies deriving from the context of their formation; no one today, I think, can remain true to the spirit of Marx by remaining true to the letter of Marx" (Giddens, 1979, p 1).

Marxist humanism seems to provide one of the more powerful modern research programmes with which to address crucial issues of resources, population, famine, social and political control and manipulation, spatial structures, and urban development.

Dialogue has been directly engaged between Duncan and Ley (1982) and the Marxists (Chouinard and Fincher, 1983), between Ley (1982) and critical theory (Gregory, 1982), and at least two recent essays seek to develop a humanistic Marxism for geography (Eyles, 1981; Cosgrove, 1983), a project with which Harvey has also been concerned. These debates will no doubt appear in more fully developed position statements in the near future. Harvey (1985) exemplifies some of the claims made above.

For our present purposes we do not need to enter into the debate with Marxism. However, we do need to address the implications of the claims arising from Marxist geography insofar as they raise serious questions about the fundamental categories of humanism. In particular we need to address the criticism of idealism, subjectivism, and voluntarism in humanistic perspectives.

(iii) The structuralist critique

According to Anthony Giddens (1979, p 38) the way in which the literature of structuralism has rejected humanism is scandalous, and derives from a deep

(iv) Beyond subjectivism

mistrust of consciousness or 'subjectivity'. It is not that humanism's call to consider the world of the subject has been answered. Instead the structuralism of Saussure's linguistics, of Marx's political economy, and of Freud's psychology seeks to question whether and how man can know himself. Each questions the possibility of the Cartesian cogito understanding itself. Consciousness can no longer be regarded as a given, but is to be studied in terms of its constitution or production; how it came to be the way it is. The 'I' - the subject of humanistic geography - is acknowledged only through its social production, that is through signification. For Marxism this is to shift from an idealist to a materialist interpretation. Similarly each in a different way raises important questions about the way in which method is to be grounded in other than self-clarification for the researcher, as Descartes (and, following him, most of empirical science) had claimed.

The issue is important not simply because of the question it raises about the validity of humanism's assumption that the world of the subject represents a viable topic of investigation, but also for the way in which the issue represents a crucial boundary line between humanism as subject-orientated (subjectivism and voluntarism) and humanism as discussed by the structuralists. Once again David Harvey provides an illustration of this distinction. In his review of Wheatley's (1971) *The pivot of the four quarters: a preliminary enquiry into the origins and character of the ancient Chinese city*, Harvey (1971) suggests that in attributing the transition from non-urban to urban forms of social organization to a conceptual change in religious authority Wheatley's fine work is flawed. In thus ascribing change to religious organisation Wheatley interprets urban transformation in terms of "superficial movements in ideology and cosmic symbolism" (p 512). Far more penetrating, if harder to discern, would be a materialist explanation which attributed the transition from non-urban to urban forms of social organization in terms of a shift in the economy or mode of production. The idealist interpretation (represented by Wheatley's position) attributes change to the superstructure of society. Whereas, while these ideological factors may influence the substructure (the economic base or mode of production) they are not decisive or primary. The relationship between base and superstructure is therefore fundamental to the debate over humanism. The attribution of social changes to superficial movements in ideology and cosmic symbolism presupposes a Cartesian cogito, with the ability to see clearly, understand what is seen, and to decide rationally between the available options. According to Harvey then this voluntarist position ignores the very structures over which man has no control, which he may not recognize, and which remain hidden from view.

In discussing humanism (and phenomenology in geography) Neil Smith (1979, p 367) suggests that the "attempt to transcend the subjective-objective dichotomy is only partly successful, for while phenomenology may delight us with accounts of individual and cultural experience, it will also frustrate us by its inability to convey coherently the brutal objectivity of much everyday experience. It can say little about the societal creation and manipulation of reality." By restricting itself to the immediacy of human awareness, instead of the objective realities of the world, humanism is unable to deal with objective structures. Its emphasis on consciousness and knowing deludes the geographer and results in superficial analysis. 'conscious meaning' is inadequate and does not penetrate to the objective structures of man's historical relationship with nature (Smith, 1979, p 367).

The reader who has followed the arguments of this work thus far may begin to feel rather uneasy. Not only have we seen that the humanist and Marxist critique of misplaced realism (concreteness) in positivist empirical science raises serious questions about the ontological and methodological assumptions of spatial analytic approaches, that the fact-value separation is misplaced, and that all knowledge is interest-laden, but now we begin to suggest that the turn from objectivism has misplaced its faith in individual differences, perceptions, attitudes, and values. Essentially we begin to suggest that the turn to subjectivity, which has been claimed to typify the humanist project is itself a misconstrual of the actual nature of man and man's relation to the world.

On the one hand, the world does not exist independently from the way in which it is given to man. This is the beginning claim of phenomenology, that all knowing is intentional. That is, that every thought and perception is always a thought or perception of some thing. Conversely, for every thing there is always someone for whom it is the thing that it is. Man and world are only and always given for each other. On the other hand, this is not a form of subjectivism (where the world is merely a product of individual perception) nor is it a form of idealism (where only spirit or idea has meaning). In this section I will attempt to make this claim, before moving on to (a) suggest how such a conception might influence the practice of geography, and (b) how it might change the nature of thinking about the world.

(v) Can there be or should there be a humanism?

We have seen earlier that concern has been expressed about the appropriation of 'humanism' by one group of geographers (Morrill, 1983). Others have seen humanism as soft-headed and parochial (Harvey, 1974; Smith, N., 1979). Humanistic geography is nonetheless widely accepted as a label for identifying a particular approach to and research programme in geography, and as a badge of pride by those engaged in extending scientific and artistic forms of inquiry to take account of man's symbolic, religious, and cosmological relationships with place, landscape, and society. Can we step outside of this situation to evaluate the nature of the claim for a humanism in a deeper sense than we have thus far allowed ourselves?

The modern conception of humanism owes much to the work of Jean Paul Sartre. In particular, in *Existentialism is a humanism* (Sartre, 1946) Sartre defined existentialism - what has become the central philosophy of humanism (Entrikin, 1976; Ley and Samuels, 1978; Samuels, 1978, 1981) - as the conviction "that existence precedes essence" (a claim that Ley has rightly taken issue with). In this view the humanist must take the subjectivity of man as the point of departure. In this view human nature does not exist other than as man acts and in what he does. Man must choose and act without appeal to any boundary conditions which guarantee the correctness of the choice or the action. The freedom of man is rooted in this subjectivity. The cogito of Descartes thus becomes the only possible basis for a humanism.

In geography humanism begins with the subjectivity of the 'self' - a thinking being, a rational animal, who constructs his or her own world. It should be no surprise then that modern geographic humanism (and it should be noted - geography generally) continually flirts with relativism.

In view of some of the criticisms made against 'humanism', and bearing in mind the outright rejection of humanism by Relph (1981), is it necessary that we retain this term 'humanism'? Or is it the case, as Heidegger (1977, p 195) suggests, that the use of such '-isms' has long been suspect and damaging, and is demanded merely by the market of public opinion? Of what value are such labels? Do we gain a clarity of thought by talking of humanistic versus positivistic versus Marxist geography?

We do presume them to be important as wayfinding tools for teaching and discussion; as a means of introducing new students to an unfamiliar intellectual landscape. But do they have any further value? Indeed, do they even have value as heuristic coordinate systems? What happens when we use such labels? Their use is a shorthand, and saves the need to deal with the actual detailed arguments each position entails. It is precisely because such labels 'hide' critical issues and arguments that monograph of this sort are repeatedly needed to clarify again and again what lies behind the '-isms'. However, through the use of labels thinking comes to an end. Thinking is thereby replaced by '-isms' as technical instruments of education. Each '-ism' becomes an account of a particular view, and offers itself as a position that provides more than the others. Competition for this public opinion results in arguments about '-isms', and in a progressive forgetting of thinking (Heidegger, 1977, p 197).

We have seen in the preceding pages a variety of attempts in geography to define 'humanism'. By and large these definitions take humanism to be a concern for the nature of man: that he become free to fulfill his humanity, and that he not be abstracted out of discourse and models dealing with human, social, and economic relationships. More specifically, at the centre of man-land and spatial relationships must be retained man himself, not an abstracted model of man.

There is no doubt that many would agree with the spirit of this definition, but given the debate over humanistic approaches in the discipline it is clear that no fundamental agreement has been reached. At issue is the interpretation of what constitutes freedom and man's essential humanity. If humanism is the concern for man's freedom and his humanity, "then humanism differs according to one's conception of the 'freedom' and 'nature' of man" (Heidegger, 1977, p 201). The humanity of man is determined in terms of already established interpretations of nature, history, and world. Or, put slightly differently, every humanism is based upon a metaphysics. This is no less true of Roman humanism than of modern humanism. Each presupposes the universal 'essence' of man as being obvious. Most commonly man is considered to be an *animale rationale* - the rational, thinking animal. But is man merely quantitatively different from animals with the addition of rational faculties, as the science of biology teaches us, or is something else at issue here? Man is an animal, and we cannot deny his common biological heritage. But when we describe man as the thinking animal we also thereby consign his being to the dimension of *animalitas*, to which is added the faculty of thought. This remains true even as we move to conceive of man as subject, person, or Spirit. It is clear in the structure and substance of the work of Yi Fu Tuan (1974b, 1975, 1977), and it is to be found in much geographic humanism, deriving from its immediate heritage in the biological basis of perception in environmental perception research. Here even the claims to man's humanity are located (through a reductionism) in the domain of biology and psycho-biology.

When Tuan (1975) asks "how does mere location become place?" his answer is that human spaces are constructed by accretion of basic spatial experiences: from biological ("space, biology and symbolism"), psychological ("spatial preferences of the ego"), personal ("personal experiential space"), social ("group experiential space") to symbolic spaces ("mythical-conceptual space"). This range of spatial forms (from biological to symbolic) is replicated in Sack (1980), and is now broadly accepted in much geographical literature as a series of distinct, more or less autonomous kinds of space (see Gatrell, 1983; and my review Pickles, 1985). Each step in the progression, from biological to symbolic, broadens the formalized notions of reality incorporated in the models of spatial analysis, cognitive behaviouralism, and environmental perception studies. But what is forgotten here is that man's essential and immediate being is not constructed by science or formal inquiry, but 'deconstructed' by it. Man is prior to his abstraction by scientific analysis. When Tuan asks how "mere location becomes place?" he, and the whole tradition following him, put the question upside down. The real question is "how has place become mere location?" Places exist, albeit as Relph (1976a) suggests in increasingly uninteresting and uninspiring forms. Man ek-sists (that is he stands out) as a mythical-symbolic being in a social world. This is the first reality and man's first knowledge of himself. Only through the abstractions and formalisms of science has place come into being as mere location. It is not that the claims of the sciences are mistaken. They are as far as we yet know correct. The point is that, just as *homo economicus* and *homo ludens* are abstract models of man which reduce his essence to one posited interpretation of his being, so *homo rationalis* founded on *animale rationale* reduces man in a similar manner.

(vi) Concluding comments

The current turn in humanistic geography is a turn away from the presuppositions of Cartesian science which underlie the spatial analytic and behavioural geographies of the 1960s and 1970s and the early formulations of humanism itself. It is a rejection of the real-subjective dichotomy from which Cartesian science begins. Humanistic perspectives recognize that "there is a genesis and development of meaning already at work in the life-world".

What is overlooked in such a scheme of things is the various forms of insight and signification that are already operative within the texture and flow of ordinary experience. These significations are admittedly prephilosophical and prescientific but not, therefore, devoid of knowledge-bearing comprehension. In the performance of everyday speech, in the production and use of tools and utensils, in the handshake and in the embrace, in laughing and crying, in the poetics of the dance, in the rituals of etiquette and religion, in the planning of affairs of households and economy, and in the posture of silence, a comprehension of self and world is already at work. (Schrag, 1980, p 63)

The task for humanists in the next few years must be to demonstrate that the significations of everyday experience can be articulated as something beyond the mere archaeology of the trivial and the detail of the antiquarian. Thoughtful reflection as well as careful methodology will be necessary if this world of meaning is to be re-captured in the context of inquiry and knowledge which both frees and empowers us all.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

a priori: knowledge that is logically or ontologically prior to experience, and provides the necessary conditions for such experience.

atomism: the doctrine that material reality is composed of simple and interchangeable particles. All observable changes can be explained in terms of the differences in configuration of these particles. When applied to social situations atomism deals with social patterns as the result of the configuration of individual 'atomistic' units or elements.

behaviourism: an approach to psychology which is linked with the philosophical tradition of empiricism. Behaviourism views everyday behaviour in terms of a series of stimulus-response interactions. Generally only visible behaviours are accepted as real behaviours, and only these are taken into account. All mentalistic or experiential processes are ruled out of consideration as subjective, imprecise or as epiphenomena. Thus the notion of valid evidence is restricted to the observation of overt behaviours; consciousness is seen to be inaccessible to such observation, and thus thoughts, memory and feelings are to be excluded from research as valid evidence.

cogito: Latin meaning 'I think'. As an argument it was used by Descartes (Meditations II) to establish the existence of the self. Cogito ergo sum ("I think therefore I exist") is an attempt to ground existence in certain knowledge of the self.

cognitive behaviouralism: In geography Downs (1970) and others have used this term, taken from Sprout and Sprout (1965) to distinguish concern for imagery, preference, and cognition from strict behaviourism as stimulus-response psychology.

dialectic: originally the art of discussion and debate, and the investigation of truth by discussion. From German philosophy dialectic extends the notion of contradiction in the course of discussion to contradictions in reality. Thus, for Hegel parts and whole are dialectically related. With Fichte the dialectical process is characterized as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. With Marx the dialectic comes to represent the progressive unification of social forms through the contradiction of opposites.

doxa: Greek meaning 'opinion' or 'belief'. Doxa refers to the form of knowledge involving belief and its modifications (doubt, affirmation, assumption).

empiricism: holds that knowledge has its source and derives its context from experience. Sense experience and inductive reasoning from sense experience provide the basis for true claims about the world.

environmental determinism: determinism (from the Latin *determinare* - to set bounds or limits') is the doctrine that events in the world are guided entirely by law. Environmental determinism holds that all aspects of human history are dependent upon and conditioned by physical or environmental causes.

episteme: refers to knowledge which is certain (eg. as in science).

epistemology: the theory of the origin, structure, methods, and validity of knowledge. Epistemology is specifically concerned with: (i) the possibility of knowledge; (ii) the limits of knowledge; (iii) the origin of knowledge; and (iv) the different kinds of knowledge.

Erklären: German meaning 'to explain'. In science Erklären has been taken to refer strictly 'to subsume under a scientific theory' or 'to exhibit as an instance of a scientific law'. (See Verstehen).

ethnomethodology: is an approach to inquiry which attempts to move away from methods of analysis in which the researcher's own categories and values are imposed on the behaviour under study. In so doing ethnomethodology seeks to uncover the implicit rules which govern human behaviour and how these are understood by those involved.

existential philosophy: argues that all knowledge is in consciousness. There is no need to posit an external and internal world divorced from each other since all phenomena are examined by consciousness. Opposing the Kantian notion of the 'thing-in-itself', existentialism challenges realism and essentialism, and the distinction between the existence of a thing and its essence. Instead existentialism concentrates on the human condition. With Sartre existentialism posits man's radical freedom, his finitude, the importance of values, and authenticity.

formalism: the tendency to emphasize form over content. In spatial analysis this involves the focus on spatial arrangement to the exclusion of substantive consideration of content. (See also spatialism).

hermeneutics: from the Greek *hermeneutikos* (meaning 'interpretation'). Refers originally to biblical exegesis and interpretation. Hermeneutic philosophy has progressively seen the text as a model for human action. In the philosophy of the social science, methods are seen as more closely akin to text interpretation than experimental method.

humanism: is the view that takes human beings to be the ultimate source of meaning and value. It seeks to avoid subsuming man to a theology or a materialism, and places emphasis upon man and his well-being.

idealism: argues that ideas, thoughts, and mind, instead of objective and material conditions, determine life and our knowledge of it.

idiographic: refers to the particular or the specific. An idiographic science is hence a science of particulars. History has been seen in this way, and in geography the study of regions has been characterized as idiographic. (See nomothetic).

individualism: the doctrine that emphasizes the centrality of the concrete individual in explaining the world. In philosophy and social science, individualism is very much associated with liberalism and subjectivism.

intentionality: this is the characteristic of consciousness that it is only in relation to some object. Object and consciousness of object are intentionally related, and are only given as such. Thus any intending

always points beyond itself to some object(s), and any object always points beyond itself to its objective background or to something that it represents or indicates – as a pen points to writing, and as a fever indicates the existence of illness.

intersubjectively accessible experiences: these are not the same as shared experiences, although shared experiences are by definition intersubjectively accessible. Intersubjectively accessible experiences are experiences which in principle, if not in practice, we may share with others. For example, in psychology the scientist is not concerned with what makes my sadness my own, but with sadness as such – a sadness which we may all in principle recognize as such.

logical empiricism: is associated with the Vienna School of Carnap, Hempel, etc. In this position only two types of meaning are recognised: factual and formal. Factual statements are established by sensory verification and science. Formal statements are established by rules of logic and syntax. Statements that cannot be verified factually or formally are literally non-sense, and hence meaningless.

liberalism: holds man to be a free, rational individual. As a doctrine based on individualist theories of man and society liberalism has been referred to as the highest form of bourgeois society under capitalism. Liberalism is a doctrine of certain necessary kinds of freedom within the context of a possessive individualism.

materialism: the doctrine of materialism accepts physical explanations of the origins of nature and life, often accepting as its fundamental premise a form of mechanics where social events are explained in terms of physical bodies in motion. Marxist materialism rejects this one-sided concern for mechanical explanation, because it rejects the subjective role of human activity. Marx distinguished between mechanical materialism and historical materialism. The latter includes human activity as a primary force.

methodology: the systematic analysis and organization of the rational and experimental principles and processes which guide scientific inquiry. Each science partakes of generally accepted scientific methods as well as the methods peculiar to its own requirements and evidential foundation.

monadical: the term monad is derived from the Greek term for 'unit' or 'one'. In its usage here the monad refers to a closed being or mind, a *res cogitans*, which views the world as if from a window, through perceptions from a particular point of view. Individualism and subjectivism are both, in this sense, monadical in that they found the world and knowledge of it in a single perceptive subject – the monad. In this way individualism and subjectivism are unable to account for either the genesis of understanding or the nature of social experience.

multiple realities: in adapting William James's 'sub-universes of reality' Schutz argued that we can speak of finite provinces of meaning. Such provinces of meaning, or multiple realities comprise social reality. We speak of the world of dreams, the scientist's world, the world of the housewife, the world of sport, etc. Each of us lives in several

such concurrent and competing orders of reality. But it is the world of everyday experience which has priority because it grounds all other worlds (Heidegger) and because only in it is communication possible (Schutz).

naturalism: often associated with empiricism and materialism, naturalism is used here to refer to the tendency to explain social phenomena in terms of natural science, that is to reduce the social domains to some aspect of the natural domain. (Also see spatialism.)

nomothetic: refers to the search for general relationships and laws. In its concern for the general, nomothetic science has been said to be the only true form of scientific geography; as the only form of explanation that yields general patterns, regularities and laws. (See idiographic.)

objectivism: assumes that things exist in their own right independently of the knower. (Also see realism and naturalism.)

ontology: from the Greek *ontos* ('being') and *logos* ('knowledge') ontology thus means 'knowledge of being' or the theory of the Being of beings. Husserl distinguished between formal and material ontology. Formal ontology is common to all science, eg. logic. Material ontology deals with the object domain of the particular factual sciences. For Martin Heidegger ontology is more generally conceived as the concern with the question of the meaning of Being, and the Being of beings. Its method is phenomenology.

phenomenological method: this refers to the ways in which the objects of our everyday experience (the natural attitude) are to be treated in the philosophical attitude. The leap from the former to the latter requires that we suspend ('bracket') our belief in the everyday. This 'epoché' and further reductions permit the phenomenologist to focus not on the things which make up the everyday world, but on the way in which such phenomena are given to us.

phenomenology: while phenomenology has several distinct origins and meanings, it is used here to refer to the project of Edmund Husserl and its subsequent development. Literally, phenomenology is the *logos* (the study or the speaking about) of phenomena, or the study of how objects are given. The term thus signifies a methodological conception which can be loosely summarized as 'to the things themselves!' Since phenomena are not always immediately transparent or self-evident, phenomenology is necessary to clarify what is often hidden or taken-for-granted. Geographers have most often taken this to apply mainly to the way in which everyday, taken-for-granted experience can be described and clarified. It can, however, apply to any phenomenon where meaning has become sedimented: science, power, language, etc.

pluralism: the assumption of not one or two but many independent realities.

positivism: equates what positive natural science knows and can know with what is the case. Knowledge is limited to observable facts and their interrelations. Thus science provides the only reliable knowledge. To be real a phenomenon must be perceptible as concretely existing in space and time. The tangibility of things proves their reality. The

intangible we cannot know scientifically, and therefore it cannot be real, but is subjective.

pragmatism: is the philosophy of experience which focuses on understanding the dynamics of social processes. By focusing on practical effects, pragmatism has been seen as a humanistic philosophy which rejects traditional realism. It assumes that knowledge is evaluated in terms of its usefulness; objects are defined and gain their meaning in terms of their usefulness; and understanding must be inferred from behaviour. In this view reality is only partially known. Since the world is seen to be a human construction, knowledge is continually developed through experience and experiment, and this is to be achieved using logic and scientific method as practical tools to problem solving.

rationalism: holds that knowledge and truth are to be tested by intellectual and deductive rather than sensory methods. Reason is thus given priority over experience, and rationalism is often opposed to empiricism.

realism: epistemological realism assumes that experience reports a true and uninterrupted, if limited, account of objects, giving us an accurate and direct knowledge of the actual world.

reductionism: the attempt to reduce one science or one domain of phenomena to another by demonstrating that the key elements or concerns of one area can be explained in terms of another. Thus, environmental perception may reduce experience to psychology, cognitive psychology to neural physiology, or biology is reduced to chemistry and ultimately to physics.

relativism: this view holds that all truth, values, or moral judgements are relative. In science such a view leads to a pluralism of perspectives without standards or criteria on the basis of which the correct position can be determined.

research programme: is the term used by the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos in preference to the looser term 'paradigm' used by Thomas Kuhn. Research programmes refer to the web of definitions, concepts, and approaches which constitute the perspective of a particular field of scientific inquiry.

scientism: is the view that the claims of science give us the only truly reliable knowledge. For this reason scientific claims are given priority over ethical and moral claims in social behaviour.

signification: used synonymously with 'meaning', 'connotation', or 'intention'.

spatialism: in the same way that scientism reduces valid knowledge to scientific claims, and biologism reduces social relations to biological explanation, spatialism reduces explanation of human behaviour to its formal spatial arrangement.

structuration: developed in geography by Derek Gregory, and adapted from the work of Anthony Giddens, structuration attempts to articulate experience and meaning with the structures within which meaning occurs.

On the one hand it involves a concern for the power of human agency. On the other hand it recognizes the boundedness of practical life within social and material structures.

subjective idealism: coined by Schelling to describe the philosophy of Fichte, which held the world to be a posit of the judging subject.

subjectivism: the doctrine that limits knowledge to the mind's awareness of its own states. Studies of perception which assume a representational translation of world to image are often of this type. Also see idealism, subjective idealism, voluntarism.

teleology: a teleological argument claims (i) that the world is ordered; and (ii) that therefore it was produced according to some grand design. Thus an argument from teleology (telos, Greek, 'end' or 'goal') suggests that processes and structures occur for some specific end.

Verstehen: German meaning 'to understand'. Verstehen was used by the sociologist Max Weber to refer to a method by which we can understand the actions of another. Understanding of the subjective meaning behind action must be situated within the context of typical patterns of action, and is not merely subjective impressions or undisciplined intuition. Much confusion has arisen in the interpretation of this problem, in part because Verstehen as an experiential form of common sense knowledge has been confused with Verstehen as a method of the social sciences. In understanding everyday life Verstehen is the process by which social actors understand what is meant by their actions. In social science Verstehen is the procedure by which we seek to explain everyday experience with categories and constructs that have meaning for those involved in the action (referred to by Alfred Schutz as the "postulate of subjective interpretation") (see Erklären).

voluntarism: the theory that the will is the ultimate constituent of reality. The voluntarist position assumes human will to be central in explaining behaviour.

voluntaristic idealism: voluntarism suggests that man's experience is a product of human will. Voluntaristic idealism thus roots man's experience in the individual, in a res cogitans, and as with a monadical view, grounds an account of human behaviour in subjectivism and individualism.

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